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ABSTRACT 
The vast amount of environmental philosophy texts offers many solutions and methods with 
which to approach ecological crises. Quite often though, these solutions are contradictory. 
Environmental awareness is often cited as the justification for many competing strategies, 
policies, and everyday actions. With so many conflicting and confusing reports, it is difficult to 
know how we should relate to nature or which approach to adopt; which method is both plausible 
and ethical. In this paper I discuss and analyse the views of radical ecology and holistic 
environmental ethics in order to identify their underlying moral frameworks to ascertain their 
practical consequences with regards to humanity. In the first chapter I present and analyse the 
radical ecology position inclusive of deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism. I then 
isolate and analyse the underlying ethical framework of the radical ecology position and evaluate 
what the costs and benefits of this position regarding humanity. In the second chapter I present 
and analyse the holistic environmental ethic and then proceed with the same method as chapter 
one. In the third chapter I introduce a philosophical argument for the necessity of making the 
concern for persons the initial step in ecological attitudes. I then revisit the structures of radical 
ecology and holistic environmental ethics with this view in mind. I ultimately argue that 
although both radical ecology and the holistic environmental ethics view of nature offer valuable 
insight that they are too quick to dismiss the uniqueness of the human condition. Thus these 
methods must be modified, with a view to a humanistic approach, in order to be logically 
coherent and provide plausible frameworks from which to encounter the natural world.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
II. THE GENERAL WORRY 
Environmental concern has become the topic of general debate in the public forum in the last 
forty to fifty years. Often cited as the inspiration to the widespread recognition of environmental 
awareness is Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962). In Silent Spring Carson brought to the public 
attention scientific evidence linking the death of millions of birds to the widespread use of the 
pesticide DDT and advocates for the necessity of rethinking our attitudes towards the use of 
nature.
1
 Additionally, authors such as Henry David Thoreau, William Morris, and Aldo Leopold 
offered ground breaking ideas on the necessity of caring for and rediscovering the natural world 
through paradigm shifting approaches. Likewise, the scientific field of ecology blossomed, 
further contributing to the call for the discipline of environmental philosophy. In response to the 
awakening of environmental consciences emerged many and varied solutions and as many 
diagnoses of the problem. The study of environmental philosophy and the ecological crisis have 
become conversations of global proportions in an effort to identify causes and possible solutions.  
There are conflicting and contradictory narratives for both the cause and the solution of 
the environmental crisis. George Sessions blames Western culture for the root of the 
environmental problem, as he explains: “Western cultural ideas of the domination and control of 
nature has shaped the development and thrust of modern science and technology.”2 Furthermore, 
using the thought of Lynn White Jr., Sessions argues “Because ‘modern science and technology 
                                                          
1
 Carson’s account of the connection of DDT to the death of birds, although it inspired many into environmental 
action, is controversial as she chose particularly lurid examples and her action resulted in the death of many children 
in developing nations due to the ban of DDT. For an article that details the direct effect of DDT on birds see: Joseph 
J. Nocera, Jules M. Blais, David V. Beresford, Leah K. Finity, Christopher Grooms, Lynda E. Kimpe, Kurt Kyser, 
Neal Michelutti, Matthew W. Reudink, John P. Smol, “Historical pesticide applications coincided with an altered 
diet of aerially foraging insectivorous chimney swifts,” The Royal Society, 
http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2012/04/15/rspb.2012.0445.  
2
 George Sessions, “The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review,” Environmental Review: ER Vol. 11, No. 2 (1987), 
105-125, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3984023. 106. 
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are permeated with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature’ we will have a worsening crisis 
‘until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to serve man.’”3   
For Sessions, as for most deep ecologists, Christianity and Western culture are the source of the 
environmental problem. Alternatively, Kate Rigby argues that, “most obviously, it is important 
to note that the West does not have a monopoly on ecological errancy.”4 Meanwhile there are 
equally conflicting ideas as to the proper solution to environmental problems. Arne Naess argues 
that we can agree that “The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a 
substantially smaller human population. [And] The flourishing of non-human life requires a 
smaller human population.”5 Environmental concern is cited as justification for global policies 
and governments, inspiring global conferences and discussions. While at the same time 
environmental interests are used as the justification of small-scale local policy and practice, as 
Roger Scruton says, “The more distant the legislature from the people the greater will be the 
distortion.”6 It is a marketing ploy used to sell products as well as to limit the consumption of 
goods. Many jobs have been created in the interest of environmental consciousness and as many 
prevented in the name of conservation. Impassioned and even hostile debate affirming and 
denying environmental crises have arisen dividing and uniting countries, cities, and local 
communities.  
There are three main branches or fields of study, offering different methods or 
approaches of environmentalism. The main branches are: 1) radical ecology, which includes 
deep ecology, ecofeminism, and social ecology; 2) biocentric environmental ethics, generally 
                                                          
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Kate Rigby, “Ecocriticism,” Literary and Cultural Criticism at the Twenty-First Century, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 151-178, 157. 
5
 Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects,” Environmental Philosophy: From 
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, Michael E. Zimmerman, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 193-211, 197. 
6
 Roger Scruton, How to Think Seriously About the Planet, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 98. 
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speaking, which is concerned mostly with holistic concepts of nature although does contain some 
individualists accounts as well; 3) and anthropocentric reformism.
7
 The radical ecology approach 
maintains that we need a paradigm shifting, revolutionary approach regarding our human 
relationship towards and the understanding of nature. The general biocentric environmental 
ethics approach – both holistic and individualistic – argues that we need to combat the 
anthropocentric traditional understanding of ethics and instead employ a bio or eco centric 
approach. Anthropocentric reform primarily argues that the roots of the environmental problems 
are not the result of anthropocentrism, but are the result of greed, ignorance, or general mal-
intent. As such what is needed is the reform of government policy, an increase in education, and 
the encouragement of responsible stewardship. This view, generally speaking, considers the 
natural world as valuable only insofar as it has use to the human population. 
In the face of so many contradictory theories or approaches to how to proceed regarding 
the environmental crisis, we are often left feeling overwhelmed by deciphering which approach 
is presenting the truthful tale, and thus at a loss as to how to act. But we are also left with the 
knowledge that something must be done. We must take some action. But to whom should we 
turn? Which theorists or schools of thought present us with an honest and practical approach to 
deal with the environmental issues? 
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Environmental philosophers rarely state the moral framework from which they are theorizing.
8
 
Similarly though, our ethics do not exist within a vacuum; there are underlying assumptions that 
                                                          
7
 Michael E Zimmerman, “General Introduction,” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical 
Ecology, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998, 3-5. 
8
 Peter Singer explicitly mentions that he is working from within a utilitarian moral framework and that his praxis 
corresponds accordingly. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics. Second Edition, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
1999.  
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we have towards life that influence the way that we view morality.
9
 Conversely, our ethical 
assumptions guide our actions. Thus each of the approaches to environmentalism above make 
assumptions regarding the nature of ethics, each in turn relying on different moral structures. 
These moral structures require further that they make assumption regarding the nature of human 
beings and our relationship with the natural world. With the expansive amount of literature and 
policy regarding environmental action, how are we to adopt an attitude or philosophical approach 
to nature? It is often difficult to identify the normative implications with regards to our lives and 
the lives of other human beings, as well as the implications for the rest of the biotic community. 
In my thesis I will analyse the moral frameworks underlying the fields of radical ecology 
and holistic environmental ethics respectively. I will uncover and analyse the implications that 
they hold regarding the human species. I will determine further if and where these frameworks 
should be adapted with regard to human application. I introduce a philosophical argument for the 
necessity of making the concern for persons the initial step in ecological attitudes. I then revisit 
the structures of radical ecology and holistic environmental ethics with this view in mind. I 
ultimately argue that although both radical ecology and the holistic environmental ethics view of 
nature offer valuable insight that they are too quick to dismiss the uniqueness of the human 
condition. Thus these methods must be modified, with a view to a humanistic approach, in order 
to be logically coherent and provide plausible frameworks from which to encounter the natural 
world.   
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
A. Significance for the Environmental Philosophy 
                                                          
9
 A point also referred to my Michael P. Nelson, in “Aldo Leopold, Environmental Ethics, and the Land Ethic.” 
Wildlife Society Bulletin (1973-2006) Vol. 26, No. 4 (1998) 741-744. 
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There is a vast amount of literature circulating regarding environmentalism. Although the 
various positions offer philosophical arguments, quite often the language of thinkers is 
ambiguous, focused entirely on practice rather than theory, or even mystical. Identifying the 
theoretical ethical structures necessitate that the different methods be understood with clarity 
regarding their logical coherence. Furthermore, by identifying the ethical frameworks from 
which the approaches are operating, provides three possibilities concerning the theories: 1) it 
connects a relatively new environmental philosophy with an established ethical theory, which 
opens it to the possibility of stronger support from the expansive ethical canon or critique 
depending on where one’s views align; 2) if the environmental philosophy is completely radical 
and not operating on any classical ethical worldview, identifying the structure provides clarity 
through which to view the strengths, weaknesses, or possible internal contradictions within this 
new approach; 3) if it is a combination of both, built on an existing moral structure but with 
significant modifications, we can identify whether it is logically consistent as a theory or whether 
it requires further modifications. The focus on the cost/benefit analysis with regards to humanity 
will identify exactly what is at stake for the person or persons who adopt or promote the different 
philosophical approaches. Additionally, the normative application with regards to humanity will 
offer insight with how to practically apply aspects of the different methods under review.  
B. Significance for Daily Practice 
We are encouraged daily to adopt practices to aid in averting the ecological crisis. Identifying the 
underlying moral framework and the implications that they have, specifically for humans, will 
aid in our ability to discern whether or not an environmental philosophy is consistent with our 
existing ethical practices. If so, allowing us to adopt a more eco-friendly and knowledgeable way 
11 
 
of life. If not, it will provide reasons to consider whether our current ethical assumptions or our 
possible environmental approach should be modified.  
IV.  PLAN OF RESEARCH 
A. Methodology 
To quote Arnes Naess, “One should not expect too much from definitions of movements; think, 
for example, of terms like “conservatism,” “liberalism,” or the “feminist movement.”10 The same 
critique can be applied to “environmentalism” as well. As such, I will begin by looking at the 
positions presented by the founders or most influential thinkers within the different philosophies. 
For example for the deep ecology movement I will look at the writings of Arne Naess, George 
Sessions, and Bill Devall. While for the holistic environmental ethics position I will consider the 
writings of Aldo Leopold, J. Baird Callicott, and Holmes Rolston III. Once I have presented the 
views of the respective movements, I will analyse the underlying moral structures on which the 
philosophies are built. Through analysis of the moral frameworks I will discuss the assumed 
ethical code which the respective contrasting approaches hold. By isolating the ethical 
framework one can more clearly understand the implications that the positions present. Often the 
result or the practical implications of a method are obscure, but when only the values are present 
it is much easier to see what is at stake and entailed by adoption of the method.  
Given that the purpose of this project is to ascertain whether or not positions should be 
adopted with respect to their cost or benefit towards humanity, I then consider what is entailed 
by the different approaches concerning humanity. Finally I introduce philosophical arguments 
that show the necessity of first acknowledging the uniqueness of the human species and the 
                                                          
10
 Arnes Naess, “The Deep Ecology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects,” Environmental Philosophy: From 
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998, 193-211, 196. 
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necessity of returning to a human scale in order to resolve the conflicts contained in the radical 
ecology and biocentric environmental ethics structures. 
Definitions 
1. Anthropocene: Relating to or referring to the current geological age. “The Age of 
Man.” First used by ecologist Eugene F. Stoermer.11 
2. Anthropocentric: (1) Considering human beings as the most significant entity of 
the universe. (2) Interpreting or regarding the world in terms of human values and 
experiences.
12
 
3. Biocentrism: The view or belief that the rights and needs of humans are not more 
important than those of other living things.
13
 
4. Biodiversity: The variety of all forms of life, from genes to species, through to the 
broad scale of ecosystems.
14
 
5. Cartesian Dualism: A theory or system of thought that regards a domain of reality 
in terms of two independent principles, especially mind and matter. The mind and 
the material body are completely different types of substances that interact with 
each other.
15
  
6. Deep Ecology: A movement originally developed by the Norwegian philosopher 
Arne Naess. It emphasizes that human beings are only part of the ecology of this 
planet, and believe that only by understanding our unity with the whole of nature 
                                                          
11
 Holmes Rolston, III, “The Anthropocene! Beyond the Natural?” Stephen M. Gardiner and Allen Thompson, The 
Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, New York, Oxford University press, 2017, 62.  
12
 Merriam Webster: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric.  
13
English Oxford Living Dictionaries. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/biocentrism. 
14
 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published June 11, 2013 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/biodiversity/. 
15
 While Descartes may have intended his cogito to refer to a distinction between mind and body rather than two 
completely different substances, environmental philosophy interprets the cause of the subjugation of the material 
world as stemming from the substance dualist interpretation of Descartes’ thought. Since substance dualism is the 
main interpretation among environmental philosophy it will also be the definition used throughout this paper.  
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can we come to achieve full realization of our humanity. Deep ecology believes 
that all organisms are equal: Human beings have no greater value than any other 
creature, for we are just ordinary citizens in the biotic community, with no more 
rights than amoebae or bacteria.
16
  
7. Ecology: (1) The science concerned with the interactions of living organisms with 
each other and with their environment, also called bionomics. (2) The system 
within the environment as it relates to organisms living in it.
17
 
8. Ecofeminism: There is no single definition of ecofeminism. Ecofeminists agree 
that the domination of women and the domination of nature are fundamentally 
connected and that environmental efforts are therefore integral to work to 
overcome the oppression of women. Ecofeminists do not seek equality with men 
as such, but aim for the liberation of women as women. Central to this liberation 
is the recognition of the value of the activities traditionally associated with 
women; childbirth, nurturing, and the whole domestic arena.
18
 
9. Radical Ecology: The movement which claims that their analyses disclose the 
conceptual, attitudinal, social, political, and cultural origins of the ecological 
crisis. It argues that only a revolutionary or a cultural paradigm shift can save the 
planet from ecological devastation.
19
 
10. Social Ecology: founded by Murray Bookchin, social ecology claims that the 
environmental crisis is a result of the hierarchical organization of power and the 
                                                          
16
 The Green Fuse/Topics: http://www.thegreenfuse.org/deepecology.htm.  
17
Biology Online: http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Ecology. 
18
 The Green Fuse/Topics, http://www.thegreenfuse.org/ecofem.htm.  
19
 Michael Zimmerman, “General Introduction,” Environmental Ethics: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology,  
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1-16, 4.  
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authoritarian mentality rooted in the structures of our society. The Western 
ideology of dominating the natural world arise from the social relationships.
20
  
B. Chapter Summary 
In chapter 1 I will present the main positions of the radical ecology movement, from the 
positions of deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism respectively. I will then analyse the 
moral framework upon which the radical ecology movement is built. With the moral framework 
in view I will make comparisons to existing ethical theories identifying which are the most 
influential to the radical ecology movement. Of particular focus will be the implications for the 
human species. The ultimate goal of the analysis of the moral frameworks is to determine the 
cost/benefit with regards to humans and where or whether aspects of radical ecology movement 
should be adopted as daily practice. Chapter 2 deals with the holistic environmental ethic view. I 
will present the main arguments of this movement through the writing of Leopold, Callicott, and 
Rolston III. Once the main ideas are presented I adopt the same approach as Chapter 1 and 
analyse the moral framework specifically with an eye towards the cost and benefit towards 
humanity. Ultimately, I will determine which aspects of the holistic approach should be adopted 
and which (if any) require further modification. In Chapter 3 I reconsider the thought of Aldo 
Leopold with a second interpretation of his view of humanity. I also introduce the thinkers who 
advocate for concern for individual persons as the necessary first step in the resolving ecological 
problems. The ideas are presented through E F Schumacher, Oliver Rackham, P. B. Medawar, 
Wendell Berry, and Daniel Berthold-Bond. With the introduction of thought focused on a deeper 
concern for humanity I suggest that the application and theories of radical ecology and holistic 
                                                          
20
 The Green Fuse/Topics: http://www.thegreenfuse.org/socialecology.htm.  
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environmental ethics would benefit from a consideration of these human-scaled and human-
centred philosophies. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
I conclude by arguing that although the methods of radical ecology and holistic environmental 
ethics offer insightful and important ideas, they must first have concern for the human species 
and return to a human scale in order to resolve the logical contradictions they contain and in 
order to be applied in a plausible and ethical manner.  
16 
 
Chapter 1: Radical Ecology 
I. The Necessity of a Paradigm Shift: Response to the Ecological Crisis 
There are many different versions of theories which can claim the title “radical ecology.” 
The underlying feature of radical ecology is the assertion that we need a paradigm shift in order 
to engage with and resolve the current ecological crisis. The understanding of humanity’s place 
in the world, our importance, our hierarchical standing, the concerns which we have, our 
understanding of ourselves must change in order to deal with the state that we caused in the 
world. As stated by Edgar D. Mitchell upon the return mission of Apollo 14, in reference to how 
to resolve the eco-crisis what we need “is a transformation of consciousness.”21 While there are 
many different creeds or responses contained within the “radical ecology movement,” the 
movement is made coherent through the agreement of the following reasons.
22
 First, as Michael 
Zimmerman states, “they claim that their analyses disclose the conceptual, attitudinal, social, 
political, and cultural origins of the ecological crisis. Second, they argue that only a revolution or 
cultural paradigm shift can save the planet from ecological devastation.”23 Unifying to the radical 
ecology movement and the diversity of writers within, from deep ecologist to ecofeminists to 
social ecologists, is the assertion that we must shift the cultural paradigm and that they have 
                                                          
21
 Edgar D. Mitchell, originally cited in Roberts, 2011. Drengson, A., Devall, B., & Schroll, M. A. (2011). 
Drengson, A., Devall, B., & Schroll, M. A. (2011). The deep ecology movement: Origins, development, and future 
prospects (toward a transpersonal ecosophy). International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 30(1-2), 101–117.. 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 30 (1)., 103  Retrieved from 
http://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/ijtstranspersonalstudies/vol30/iss1/11. 
22
 While there are many important and different aspects of the radical ecology movement, this chapter will deal 
largely with deep ecology, touching on ecofeminism and social ecology in relation to deep ecology. This is not 
because these methods are any less important, but simply because the scope of this paper will not allow for an in 
depth analysis of all three and deep ecology claims to include ecofeminism and adopts the most paradigm shifting 
approach.  
23
 Michael E. Zimmerman, “General Introduction,” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical 
Ecology, Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1998, 1-6, 4. 
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identified the origins and cause of the crisis that we face within the current, mainstream, 
paradigm.  
Deep Ecology 
The Deep Ecology Movement   
1. Arne Naess 
Norwegian mountaineer and philosopher, Arne Naess, invented the term “deep ecology” 
to distinguish it from “shallow ecology,” in his article “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range 
Ecology Movement: A Summary,” in 1973.24 Contrary to “shallow ecology,” which Naess views 
as simply an extension of North American and European “use-value” anthropocentric ethics, 
Deep Ecology calls for a upheaval or reordering of our understanding of our place in the cosmos 
and our value systems. Like any other “movement,” it is difficult to give an exact and 
comprehensive definition of Deep Ecology; Naess argues that each member has slightly varying 
conceptions as to how it should be defined. However, there are eight underlying principles which 
make up the Deep Ecology movement. While people differ on the importance or placement of 
particular principles or the various aspects of them, the principles themselves, Naess argues, all 
deep ecologists uphold. Thus the principles themselves provide the most clarity in terms of 
defining the movement. Each self-identifying deep ecologist agrees on some combination of the 
following: 
1) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human 
life on Earth have value in themselves regardless of the 
usefulness of the non-human world for the human purposes. 
                                                          
24
 Michael P. Nelson, “Deep Ecology,” Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, 206-211, 206. 
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2) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the 
realization of these values and are also values in and of 
themselves. 
3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity 
except to satisfy vital needs. 
4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible 
with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing 
of non-human life requires a smaller human population. 
5) Present human interference with the non-human world is 
excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 
6) Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect 
basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The 
resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the 
present. 
7) The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating 
life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than 
adhering to the increasingly higher standard of living. There 
will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness 
and greatness. 
19 
 
8) Those who ascribe to the foregoing points have an 
obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the 
necessary changes.
25
 
While Naess provides the principles and explanation for Deep Ecology, Harold Glasser 
argues that there are many thinkers who misinterpret or misunderstand what Naess entails in his 
thought. Through discussion of Naess’ deep ecology in “Demystifying the Critiques of Deep 
Ecology,” Glasser provides clarification and defenses to the common misconceptions of Naess’ 
thought and provides his own nuanced understanding of Naess to add further clarity. 
Significantly, he argues that while deep ecology require more care for other species, that this 
does not justify less care for humans. Additionally, population reduction or control does not 
entail draconian measures.
26
 While it is necessary that the human population be reduced this 
reduction does not justify maltreatment of living persons. 
2. George Sessions 
In George Sessions’ review of the deep ecology movement, he describes the contribution 
to deep ecology by Lynn White, Jr., which highlights what Sessions’ understanding of the root 
cause for the ecological crisis. White argues that Christianity provides the “justification” of an 
anthropocentric and subjugating view of nature.
27
 Until we rid the world of Christianity, we 
cannot hope to address the ecological crisis. Although White denounces Christianity, he does 
admire the thought and practice of St. Francis and thought that the solution to the environmental 
crisis was to adopt the ecological egalitarianism of St Francis. White’s article was reprinted 
                                                          
25
 Arne Naess, The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects. Environmental Philosophy: From 
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. Michael E. Zimmerman. New Jersey: Simon & Schuster, 1993, 196-97. 
26
 Harold Glasser, “Demystifying the Critiques of Deep Ecology.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights 
to Radical Ecology. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998, 212-226. 
27
 Sessions is making reference to Lynn White Jr.’s “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” 1967.  
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many times as well as being published in several anthologies. Christian thinkers for the most part 
denounced White’s thinking. Sessions continues that since the 1960, radical ecologists have 
taken inspiration from writers such as “Thoreau and Muir, from the Zen Buddhism of Huxley, 
Watts, and Snyder, and from the antiutopian social critiques of Huxley and Orwell.”28 
Additionally, Michael Zimmerman interpreted and developed the thought and method of 
Heidegger through an ecological lens. While Stuart Hampshire, a scholar of Spinoza, used 
Spinozo’s pantheism to critique the anthropocentric exploitation of nature.29 Naess, also drawing 
on the work of Spinoza, developed his deep ecology from the concept of universal self-
realization. Sessions further explains that, from the writings of Arne Naess, George Session and 
Bill Devell distinguished between the deep ecology and shallow ecology methods and used this 
distinction and a basis for “classifying and describing the various ecophilosophical positions.”30 
The ecological worldview, Sessions explains, questions the modern metaphysics and challenges 
us to rethink the method Western ethics entirely.
31
  
Sessions offers considerable detail in regards to the necessity of a global approach to the 
ecological crisis, citing the need for a united effort to reduce the human population as the top 
priority in order to care for the earth. While, he states it is necessary not to compromise the 
dignity of humanity, it is the duty of the United Nations to give the “highest priority to 
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stabilizing the human population in the shortest time possible.”32 On a practical level, Sessions 
argues that progress has been made in recent years to stabilizing the human population saying, 
“birth control programs, including making contraceptives freely available to all who want them, 
have quite recently proven to be highly effective in dramatically reducing birthrates in certain 
Third World countries.”33 He then further states, “Third World countries should be encouraged 
to adopt as high a priority as possible on the establishment of ecosystem protection zones, and 
the protection of large areas of free nature.”34 Thus, as developing countries have more 
undeveloped areas they should be encouraged to maintain these areas as undeveloped and since 
they also have the fastest rising populations they, most of all, should be encouraged to stabilize 
their populations.  
 
3. Bill Devall 
Bill Devall emphasises the importance of a paradigm shift to defuse an anthropocentric 
hierarchy. As he states, in “The Deep Long Range Ecology Movement 1960-2000 A Review,” 
“When they accept slogans such as “Earth First!” or “thinking like a mountain,” they are 
rejecting human hubris and placing Homo sapiens, as a species, in a more modest position in the 
cosmos.”35 He states that while there is tension within politics as there is bound to be in the 
overturning of any paradigm, “The practice of deep ecology includes both personal lifestyles and 
community lifestyles.”36  Thus politics plays a crucial part in DEM [Deep Long Range Ecology 
Movement], as in public policy we can start to think of policies for the wellbeing of all, the good 
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of the ecosystem as a whole. Additionally, like Sessions, Devall argues that this policy applies to 
developing and developed countries alike. 
While some critics argues that developing countries must primarily focus on problems of 
military conflict, poverty, gender equality, etc., Devall argues that it is DEM’s emphasis on long 
term sustainability that makes it essential for developing countries. He states, “On the contrary, 
supporters of the DEM conclude it is most appropriate for the Third World because of its 
emphasis on long-range sustainability of natural systems within which humans as well as all 
other species must dwell.”37 The natural integration of the human species with the rest of the 
ecosystems provides a means of championing social equality, whereas social justice movements 
often cause further subjugation of the nonhuman world as a result of their emphasis on human 
equality. As he states, “It is the human species that must learn to live together as a civilized and 
mutually supportive community. To focus on the development of civility among the human 
species is not to inflate unduly the importance of humanity within the ecosystem of life on Earth; 
rather it is to recognize how dangerous the human race is to the viability of the Earth's 
ecosystem.”38 The emphasis should be on the unity of the ecosystem as a whole, or a globalist 
approach (inclusive of the nonhuman) to solving such problems. 
 Devall’s view of the most significant aspects of deep ecology is made apparent through 
his discussion and interpretation of John Muir’s works. Devall argues that Muir’s greatest 
contribution to ecology is his recognition of the essential unity of all things. Devall states, “In his 
writings he uses the word God, Nature, And Beauty almost interchangeably.”39 This unity is 
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especially significant for epistemological reasons. Muir offers a way of knowing beyond 
reductionist classifications. As Devall states, “For Muir [. . .] Nature is only partly described by 
models. The map is not the territory […] He went beyond ecology as reductionist science, as 
theories of interrelationships to begin blinding with the landscape.”40 In immersing oneself in the 
landscape and seeing it as a whole, while the language becomes somewhat mystical, it allows for 
and experience and knowledge beyond categories. Devall argues that Muir’s travels in the wild 
allowed for a transformation of consciousness bringing him into self-realization. In this manner 
ecology moves beyond a use or manipulation and offers a way of being in the world. The 
following quotation from Devall regarding Muir offers a clear understanding of what Devall 
considers essential to Deep Ecology, “Muir recognized that an objective perspective would be 
different from the dualism so prevalent in Western philosophy since the seventeenth century. In 
Muir’s participatory science, his “wandering from flower to flower” was extending unity, 
flowing from the Tao.”41 In this passage Devall expresses his admiration for Muir and though 
this shows what he considers to be essential to Deep Ecology, namely, a rejection of the dualist 
Enlightenment philosophy, and self-realization through recognition of the unity of all things, 
which he expresses through Taoist philosophy.
42
  
  Social Ecology 
1. Murray Bookchin 
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In his article “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology Movement” 
Bookchin examines the tenants of the deep ecology and social ecology movements. Deep 
ecology, he argues has its foundation in an “original sin” theory that sees anthropocentrism as the 
plague upon the earth; “humanity” in its flourishing is the main cause of the environmental crisis. 
He argues that it promotes an eco-brutalism that justifies the starvation of the developing world 
in order to lighten the burden on ecological resources. Bookchin argues that deep ecology, 
championed by Naess, is a spiritual ideology, rather than intellectual movement, deriving its 
identity from Malthusian anti-humanism and “biocentric orgies.” Deep ecologists fail to 
recognize the value and uniqueness of human society, as seen through their claims that there is 
no difference between humanity and the members of the larger community of living species. 
This denial of the difference of humanity also fails to recognize that the environmental problem 
is ultimately a societal one. Instead, deep ecologists present us with, what Bookchin refers to as 
“eco-la-la,” in which humanity is dissolved into a “cosmic self” unified with bears, the earth, and 
the universe. This eco-la-la removes any remnant of concrete humanity and becomes something 
completely abstract, resulting in the loss of any notion of self. This loss of identity is something 
that is controlled by large corporations in a homogenizing movement under the guise of the 
“Connected Whole.” A problem for deep ecology, that Bookchin raises, is that in this transition 
from self-identity to the cosmic-self what are we to do with species such as smallpox or the 
AIDS virus – can they be eradicated? Or should they, in the interests of biocentrism be 
preserved? If not, who is to decide in the biocentric cosmos what species should be eradicated? 
Ultimately, Bookchin argues, the deep ecology promoted by Naess, Devall, and Sessions, 
through all of its over-spiritualised earth-loving language is little more than a justification of 
25 
 
social Darwinism, a method of keeping developing countries poor, and a “morally” acceptable 
justification of exploiting the poor and vulnerable.  
Conversely, Bookchin explains that social ecology is a “Green” movement, particularly 
leftist in its allegiance and focuses on humanism. Social ecology does not deny the uniqueness of 
the human species nor does it justify an “anthropocentricism” that in turn justifies the 
exploitation of more vulnerable humans and other species. The “marvel” nature has produced the 
“marvel” homo sapiens – homo sapiens are unique thinking species and yet entirely natural and 
as such do not resort to a dualism in their identity.  
Social Ecology focuses on the following: 
1. Global government and social movements as the solution to the environmental problems 
we face. 
2. Unwilling to accept the anti-humanist claims of the deep ecology movement. 
3. An adherence to evolutionary theory and thus the dualistic humanity vs. the nonhuman 
world tension must be dispelled. 
In order to solve the environmental crisis Bookchins states that we must look to ecology and 
reject the anti-ecologist movement of deep ecology.
43
   
A. Ecofeminism 
1. Karren J. Warren 
Simply stated by Karren Warren and Jim Cheney in “Ecological Feminism and Ecosystem 
Ecology,” ecofeminism is feminist because it has the twofold commitment to critique male bias 
in ethics and to develop methods of analysis that are not male biased. Additionally, “ecofeminist 
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ethics extends feminist ethical critiques of sexism and other social “ism of domination” to 
include critiques of “naturalism,” i.e., the unjustified domination of nonhuman animals and 
nature by humans.”44 Thus ecofeminism critiques anthropocentrism as well as androcentrism. In 
“The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism,” Karen Warren states that, “all 
ecofeminists agree about, then, is the way in which the logic of domination has functioned 
historically within patriarchy to sustain and justify the twin dominations of women and nature.”45 
Warren presents an argument that she claims has been sanctioned by the dominant Western 
culture, stemming from a patriarchal society, which goes as follows: 
(1) Women are identified with nature and the realm of the physical; men are 
identified with the “human” and the realm of the mental. 
(2) Whatever is identified with nature and the realm of the physical is inferior to 
(“below”) whatever is identified with the “human” and the realm of the 
mental; or conversely, the latter is superior to (“above”) the former. 
(3) Thus, women are inferior to (“below”) men; or conversely, men are superior 
to (“above”) women. 
(4) For any X and Y, if X is superior to Y, then X is justified in subordinating Y. 
(5) Thus, men are justified in subordinating women.46 
The above, which Warren refers to as the “logic of domination” is what all ecofeminists agree 
must be abolished in itself, in order to prevent feminism from becoming little more than a 
“support group.”  
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 While one may argue that ecofeminism does not necessarily include the natural 
nonhuman realm, Warren disagrees and states that it is because the logic of domination itself is at 
question, any form of oppression must be ended. She states the argument as follows: 
(1) Feminism is a movement to end sexism. 
(2) But Sexism is conceptually linked with naturism (through an oppressive 
conceptual framework characterized by a logic of domination). 
(3) Thus, Feminism is (also) a movement to end naturism.47 
It is the logic itself that is the fundamental issue. Thus one cannot claim to be “feminist” and not 
against naturism as well, as it is the conceptual framework of oppression that is the fundamental 
problem. Thus in order to be logically consistent, one must be both feminist and ecofeminist. 
Furthermore, the “logic of domination” refers to historically specific forms of social domination.  
 While ecofeminism rejects phrases like “necessary and sufficient conditions” for 
ecofeminism as those concepts themselves, Warren argues, are born out of an androcentric 
conceptual framework, there are some “boundaries to ecofeminism in regards to environmental 
ethics. However, these boundaries are spoken in terms of minimum conditions, providing the 
basis but not the necessary internal structure. It is a base that comes from a dynamic multiplicity 
of voices. Feminism and Ecofeminism alike share the following minimum conditions: 
a) Anti-naturist 
b) Contextual – a shift from conceptual ethical frameworks applied to individuals to a 
concept of ethics growing out of defining relationships. 
c) It is pluralistic – it presupposes and maintains difference among humans and nonhumans 
alike. 
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d) “Theory” is always “theory in process.” 
e) Inclusivist: it arises from listening to the voices of the outsider, the other, and the 
oppressed. 
f) Makes no attempt to offer an “objective” view point. 
g) Essential place for value, care, love, trust, friendship etc. – values that presuppose our 
relationships to others are essential to understanding the self.  
h) A re-imagining of what it means to be human and denial of individualism. Relationships 
are not extrinsic to humanity but an essential part of what it means to be human and to 
know the self.
48
  
Warren’s notion of ecofeminism critiques the logic of domination that is “justified” through the 
hierarchical valuing of the rational/mind attributes of humanity (historically considered male 
attributes) over the physical/embodied/or feelings attributes (historically considered as feminine 
or nonhuman). Ecofeminism does not seek to rework the system of conceptual ethics, but instead 
to dispel the framework as a whole, as it is the framework itself that is morally impermissible. 
She provides a fluid, and contextual minimum requirement boundary for how to achieve 
ecofeminsism through listening to a multiplicity of voices and views.  
2. Carolyn Merchant 
Carolyn Merchant’s insight into the historical attitudes regarding the human/nonhuman 
relationships is essential to understanding ecofeminism and radical ecology generally speaking. 
Her work The Death of Nature is a comprehensive history of the attitudes of humanity towards 
nature. It focuses specifically on the male/female analogies that undergird the different 
perspectives on nature and the role that humanity plays. Carolyn Merchant’s motivation in this 
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work is to understand and investigate the worldview and the science that led to the dominion of 
nature by man, which in turn led to the current ecological problem that we are facing and its 
connection to science, technology, and the economy. 
 Merchant begins the first chapter with the line, “the world we have lost was organic.”49 
From ancient systems of thought, right up to the sixteenth century, nature was viewed as a living 
organism, the parts of which were dependent upon each other for proper functioning and 
flourishing of the everyday life. Within the organic theory of nature, nature was metaphorically 
understood to be female in two senses: a nurturing mother, caring for and looking after the needs 
of humanity; conversely, as a wild, untamed, disordered and chaotic woman, who could cause 
storms, droughts, famine, etc. on a whim. The first metaphor – nature as nurturing mother – was 
lost within the context of the scientific revolution and nature became viewed as a chaotic 
disordered female to be controlled by the male dominated science of the Enlightenment.   
 The organic unity of thought in the Renaissance was rooted in Greek thought: Platonism, 
Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. The common denominator was that all parts of the cosmos were 
connected and interdependent as a living whole; changes of one part reflected in the changes of 
the others. Within this hierarchical yet interdependent model the well-being of each component 
was important as the well-being of the whole consisted in the flourishing of the parts. In order to 
live nature, that living unity, both male and female, must be kept well and alive.  
 In “Nature as Disorder, Merchant says the following, “Nature-culture dualism is a key 
factor in Western civilization’s advance at the expense of nature.”50 The interpretation of nature 
as organic unity transitioned to an interpretation of nature as machine. Nature, in the new 
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mechanistic framework became something to tidy, to control, to fix. The male dominated 
sciences reduced nature to her most basic parts in an effort to exploit her. This reduction to a 
non-living mechanism is what Merchant refers to as the death of nature. Earlier in the text 
Merchant showed the progress of capitalism and how women’s role in production was removed. 
Similarly, the advances of science, particularly medicine, removed the role of women from 
reproduction. Midwifery became a male practice with scientific advancement because women 
were not allowed to study and so the midwife practices of women quickly became obsolete. 
Since the role of women in the conception of a child was, wrongly, considered to be entirely 
passive, with the scientific revolution, women became entirely passive in roles regarding 
production and reproduction. Merchant uses the analogy of forceps to capture the division 
between male and female participation: just as the forceps of the doctors had removed the 
midwife from childbirth and became a tool to penetrate and exploit that field of work, so too had 
science become a method of unveiling nature’s secrets in order to study, control, and 
manipulate.
51
  
II. Analysis 
C. What are the Operative Moral Frameworks of the Radical Ecology 
Movement? 
2. What Must be Assumed to be True in Order for Their Claims to be True? 
The primary assumption for the Radical Ecology movement is that the historical notions 
of how the human species relates to the nonhuman (or in the case of ecofeminism, how male 
persons relate to females and the rest of the nonhuman male species) has been immoral and 
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subjugating, and therefore that we need a completely new way of interacting with the nonhuman 
world. Entailed by this assumption is that all hierarchies are harm-inflicting human constructs; 
there are no natural hierarchies and that hierarchies are a method of “justified” subjugation of 
other persons or species.  Thus any constructed hierarches must be dispelled. As Holy-Luczaj 
states, “all entities in the environment have an equal right to thrive. Interests of human beings are 
not considered by deep ecologists to be always inevitably superior to other beings as they are not 
justified by “higher” status of human life.”52 Further, the androcentric/anthropocentric “values” 
or “rights” moral framework must be dispelled and focus be placed more on the wellbeing of the 
whole. Although, the main critique ecofeminists have against deep ecology, as formulated by 
Zimmerman, is not that it is anthropocentric, but that it is inherently androcentric. Jim Cheney 
reformulates the ecofeminist critique, showing that they are not so concerned with the deep 
ecologist’s critique of anthropocentrism, but only that they do not do so in a strictly androcentric 
manner. However, Fox argues (which Cheney later acknowledges) the deep ecology movement 
does not rest on the language of intrinsic value or concepts of rights and thus is not subject to the 
androcentric critiques. Instead, deep ecologists are concerned with a wider state of being and as 
such with an expansive sense of self rather than rights or values. In this manner, it is similar to 
ecofeminism, which, Fox explains, is primarily concerned with the ethics of love, care, and 
friendship. One thing that the ecofeminists and deep ecologists agree on is that men have been 
far more implicated in the ecological crises than women. The deep ecologist’s main purpose is to 
unmask the anthropocentric ideology so that it can no longer be used as social domination for 
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any group or class.
53
 Thus the dispelling of any hierarchy is the foundational assumption within 
radical ecology.  
As explicitly stated above by Naess, Sessions, and Devall, the practice of deep ecology 
involves devoting work to “stabilizing” the human population. As highlighted, especially by 
Sessions, the most important and significant method of carrying out the duties of the deep 
ecology movement is to reduce the human population. As principle eight in Naess’ list states, 
“Those who ascribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to 
implement the necessary changes,” and thus, as the other principles can only be attained or 
implemented through the reduction of the human population, that is priority one in terms of 
practice. Thus each Deep Ecology must directly or indirectly work to reduce the human 
population. Conversely, anything that contributes to the growth of the human population must be 
avoided as this directly opposed all of the eight platform principles of Deep Ecology specifically, 
and radical ecology generally. However, it must be noted, as argued by Harold Glasser that 
decreasing populations do not entail draconian measures.  
 
D. What are the Positive Implications and Possible Problems of the Radical 
Ecology Moral Framework? 
3. The Benefit of the Radical Ecology Ethic to the Human Species 
The main benefit of the radical ecology movement is that it offers a method for 
dissolving the human-constructed division between humanity and the rest of the nonhuman or 
natural world. In order to identify the benefits of dispelling the human/nature conflict it is 
necessary to discuss the possible problems and implications of Cartesian dualism. Because the 
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cogito is the starting place for his philosophy Descartes has trouble maintaining an intrinsic 
relationship between mind and body. Descartes begins with the clear and distinct idea that “I am 
thinking.” He then concludes that the “thinking” belongs necessarily to the substance. Since the 
body is not the “thinking” part then one could conclude that the body is not essential to the 
human. As Fredrick Copleston states, “For if Descartes begins by saying that I am a substance 
the whole nature of which is to think, and if the body does not think and is not included in my 
clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking thing, it would seem to follow that the body does 
not belong to my essence or nature.”54 Following from the substantial differentiation of 
mind/soul and body one can conclude that the human is made up of two separate parts: body and 
soul. One can further conclude with this separation of substances that the body becomes a vessel 
for the soul. But since the essential feature is the “thinking part” and the body does not have this 
quality then the material substance becomes inferior to the thinking or rational soul. This 
separation can lead to a “justified” subjugation of the physical body to the soul. Descartes 
highlighted the distinction of mind and body but did not emphasis the complete substantial 
difference between mind and body in an effort to maintain the unity of the human person. The 
distinction between mind and body is not a problem, however, a certain interpretation of 
Descartes’ thought leads to a substantial separation of the mind and body further causing a 
subjugation of the material body. While he may not be at fault this interpretation of the mind and 
body as completely distinct, with the body as lesser, this interpretation has become the popular 
interpretation of Cartesian philosophy and the one with which environmental philosophy takes 
issue. Descartes provides the catalyst for a dualist tension between reason and the empirical 
world, which further entails a dualistic tension between humanity and the rest of the nonhuman 
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world. Because of the substantial difference of mind and body humans are “set apart” from or 
outside of the rest of the nonhuman world in a divisive manner.
55
 As Christopher J. Preston 
states, “Dualisms between culture and nature, reason and emotion, male and female, universal 
and particular, human and animal, have become mutually, enfolded and reinforcing of each 
other. But there is one dualism in particular . . . central to the creation of all others… the dualism 
between reason and nature.”56 
Both ecofeminism and deep ecology at the centre seek to dispel this dualistic tension. 
Although, as seen above, ecofeminism proposes the division is an androcentric one, with women 
included in the segregated side with the rest of the nonhuman, non-male, non-rational population. 
While social ecologists would argue against the plausibility of deep ecology, they too seek to 
dispel the dualistic division between humanity and nature.
57
 William Cronon in response to the 
“wilderness” movement articulates the central problem with this dualism as follows, “this, then, 
is the central paradox: wilderness embodies a dualistic vision in which the human is entirely 
outside the natural. If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild, 
then our very presence in nature represents its fall.”58 While Cronon is specifically referring to 
the American conversation of the preservation of the wilderness inspired by Henry David 
Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, John Muir, and the like, as they are working within the Modern 
philosophical context, the same criticism can be applied to the relationship of humanity to nature 
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generally speaking.
59
 The radical ecology movement, with its emphasis on the inherent value of 
nonhuman life, regardless of use, as well as the insistence upon the wellbeing of the whole or the 
cosmic identity, underscores the importance of a dispelling this division of humanity with nature 
and further allows for this dismissal to be done.   
A significant benefit of the Radical Ecology movement – one which also makes it very 
difficult to pin down for the very reason that it is beneficial is that it promotes the sacralising or 
re-enchanting of nature (a reason for which Murray Bookchin criticizes deep ecology). The 
mechanistic view of the natural world that comes from the Enlightenment – through the coupling 
of Cartesian and Baconian thought – that the nonhuman can be understood through a reductionist 
dissection is certainly a significant player in the justification of the exploitation of the non-
rational world. In his controversial and influential article “The Historical Roots of our Ecological 
Crisis,” Lynn White Jr. attributes this mechanistic reductionism to the dualistic division from the 
Judeo-Christian worldview.
60
 While one could argue Judeo-Christianity is not the source of the 
conflict, but rather a specific interpretation of Judeo-Christianity, his observation and assertion 
that the Enlightenment and specifically Cartesian philosophy is born out of that tradition, is 
astute and does provide a plausible cause for much of the ecological crisis.
61
 As discussed above, 
this Cartesian dualism and the philosophical conversations in response to it do champion 
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Descartes’ “reason verses the empirical” or “humanity verses the nonhuman world” dualistic 
tension. As Michael Polanyi states, “the conception of animals as machines goes back to 
Descartes.”62  Carolyn Merchant provides a vivid analogy of the transition to a mechanistic 
worldview through her description of the transition of responsibility of childbirth from midwives 
to (male) doctors’ use of metal forceps extracting the goods from and subsuming the contributing 
role of women. At this point, Merchant argues, women’s contributing roles in society were stolen 
and they became “producers” of good. Likewise, the Earth, seen as feminine, “mother,” became 
a “producer” viewed with an eye to how much she could produce – how much could be extracted 
– in a calculated and mechanistic manner. Within this mechanistic “use-value” view of the 
nonhuman world, any matter outside of the human itself (and some would argue that humanity 
itself) becomes no more than a commodity.
63
 It is difficult to ascribe inherent value beyond use. 
The radical ecology movement, through stressing the inherent value of all things or of the whole, 
overthrows this limiting mechanistic view which distils the nonhuman world to its basic parts. 
The “re-sacralizing” of the nonhuman world or the recognition of the unity of the all entails the 
upheaval of all pervasive Cartesian-Baconian mechanistic view of the natural world. I must note 
that this is not to reject a clinical understanding of the nonhuman but that there are beings that 
cannot simply be understood in that manner.  
The direct benefit, beyond the well-being of the whole worldly ecosystem, is that it 
accounts for an aspect of human knowing and experience that is commonly overlooked. In his 
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discussion of the thought of Muir, Devall states, “Muir’s intuition of unity influenced his 
epistemology […] it is difficult in our language even to describe that [connection of surroundings 
central to all life] sense.”64 This element of human knowing is perhaps more clearly articulated 
by what Michael Polanyi refers to as “tacit knowing.” In his discussion of tacit knowing, Polanyi 
states, “Speaking more generally, the belief that, since particulars are more tangible, their 
knowledge offers a true conception of things is fundamentally mistaken.”65 By claiming that we 
need to overcome or move beyond the mechanistic and dualistic way of knowing, radical 
ecology allows for the encounter with being that is quite often overlooked in our dissecting 
analysis. Polanyi uses the example of a piece of music to explain this concept of tacit knowing. 
While the knowledge of the individual is essential, if one tries to play a piece on the piano while 
focusing on each particular note, the unity of the piece is destroyed. He states, “ The word 
uttered again in its proper contest, the pianist’s fingers used again with his mind on his music, 
the features of a physiognomy and the details of a pattern glanced at once more from a distance: 
they all come to life and recover their meaning and their comprehensive relationship.”66 The 
radical ecology shift from androcentric/anthropocentric-use, dissecting mechanistic way of 
knowing opens up the sphere of knowledge for an experiential knowing of the unity of things; it 
allows for the legitimizing of other methods of knowing that are not limited to number or use-
value. It must be noted however, that this particular benefit is not to fall victim to the anti-
evolutionary thinking of Teilhard de Chardin which, as Dennett describes is to deny, “the 
fundamental idea: that evolution is a mindless, purposeless, algorithmic process.”67 So while the 
                                                          
64
 Bill Devall, “Muir as Deep Ecologist,” 66.  
65
 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009, 19. 
66
 Ibid, 19.  
67
 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, New York: Simon & Schuster 
Inc., 1996, 320. 
38 
 
“unity” or whole thinking allows for a different method or acknowledgement of knowing, this 
does not impose a mystical purposiveness on the earth’s ecosystems.  
4. The Cost of the Radical Ecology Ethic to the Human Species 
 The emphasis on the cosmic self or the unity, while it may allow for a method of 
knowing that goes beyond reductionism, appears naïve in its assertion that we can shift entirely 
from anthropocentrism. In his article on the compatibility of scientific and religious ways of 
knowing, Del Ratzsch in “Humanness in their Hearts: Where Science and Religion Fuse,” says, 
“In the human-cognitive case, we apparently have no abstraction-permitting contrast – all our 
experiences are human-mediated. And this humanness cannot be purged from science.”68 
Likewise, Thomas Nagel, in “What is it like to be a bat?” says, the following, “It is difficult to 
understand what could be meant by the objective character of an experience, apart from the 
particular point of view form which its subject apprehends it. After all, what would be left of 
what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat?”69 Although Nagel is 
responding to reductionist theories of mind in this article, his point can be applied to the 
challenge of the radical ecologists. These quotations from Nagel and Ratzsch, both emphasize 
our inability to step outside of our own consciousness. An inability to do so on the individual and 
species levels alike; we can only experience and know in relation to who we are as particular 
members of the human species. Radical Ecology, particularly Deep Ecology, requires that we 
“think for the good of the whole,” not putting our human needs above those of the other 
members of the biotic community. However, since we are not able to step outside of our 
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subjectivity, thinking in a global manner is asking something of our species that we are incapable 
of doing. Even if we imagine that we are acting in the best interests of the whole it is still in 
relation to our specifically human way of knowing. The assertion to do otherwise, the request to 
think for the good of the entire ecosystem, excludes the possibility of thinking to a human scale, 
or more simply knowing as humans.  
 Similarly, the emphasis on a “global” solution, in addition to undercutting the value of 
individuals, may simply not be practical. While radical ecology advocates for a reduction of the 
human population on a global scale, regardless of one’s position on the morality/feasibility of 
reducing the human population, the scale itself may be implausible. Once something is moved 
beyond the scale of our human knowing the level of knowledge and the significance of what can 
be lost – even without knowledge of it – can be vastly increased. As Roger Scruton states, “The 
more distant the legislature from the people the greater will be the distortion.”70 This statement is 
based simply on the recognition that we know those things which are in close proximity to us 
more than those that are far. Roger Scruton in his analysis of global attempts of ecological 
solutions gives the example of the gamekeeper verses animal rights activist. While the 
gamekeeper works within a knowledge base from being immersed in the land, “he must control 
foxes and badgers if he is to protect ground-nesting birds; plant cover if he is to retain pheasants 
and partridge; ensure berries in winter and corn and kale in summer; take action against 
scavengers, dog-walkers and so one.”71 The other, (not always of course) operates on a feeling or 
emotional, but without the key factor of risk and embodied knowing. So while the radical 
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ecologist calls for the global “stabilization” of the human population, this type of solution 
overlooks a way of knowing that is essential to practical solutions.
72
  
Likewise, this impractical “thinking for the whole” method undercuts the value of the 
individual. Kierkegaard, in explaining what he views as the danger of Hegelian philosophy 
states: 
No single individual (I mean no outstanding individual – in the sense of 
leadership and conceived according to the dialectical category of fate) will be 
able to arrest the abstract process of levelling, for it is negatively something 
higher, and the age of chivalry is gone. No society or association can arrest 
that abstract power, simply because an association is itself in the service of the 
levelling process.73 
This passage beautifully articulates Kierkegaard’s concern that what is lost in the Hegelian 
dialectic. In the Hegelian self-realising historical dialectic, Kierkegaard argues that if each 
member is acting in the self-realisation of the whole in the unfolding of history then the 
individual qua individual is not valuable in its own right, but only in relation or for the bringing 
about of the whole. In proceeding for good of the whole the uniqueness of individuals is 
“leveled” in the name of the cosmic whole. Kierkegaard’s concern with Hegelian thought can be 
applied to the deep ecology exhortations as well. Deep ecology emphasises the necessity of 
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understanding our identity in a cosmic sense rather than understanding ourselves as individuals.
74
 
Dismissing the identity of individuals diminishes the value of the individual as it attributes worth 
only in relation to the whole rather than for that being itself.  Additionally, if the value of the 
individual members is diminished then it is difficult to see how this does not diminish the value 
of the whole.  
Guilherme argues that the above objection does not stand; the value of the individual is 
not diminished through receiving their identity only in light of the cosmic whole. He argues that 
each being ought to pursue its own interest and by doing so that each contributes to the interest 
of the collective.  Maintaining that there is a connected unity of all things each being acting out 
of self-interest also contributes to the good of the whole. For example, the human being who is 
guided by reason will pursue the same goals as other human beings. Likewise, it is in the best 
interests of humans to encourage biodiversity within the whole ecosystem as the well-being of 
the whole contributes to the well-being of the human species.
75
 However, it is difficult to see 
how that manner of thinking is not appealing to anthropocentrism, which is exactly what radical 
ecology is trying to avoid. Because Guilherme’s response rests on an anthropocentric appeal it 
does not stand as a proper response to the objection that the “cosmic self” devalues the 
individual.  
The most troubling aspect of deep ecology in regards to humanity is that it requires that 
we deny our uniquely human attributes or properties. Coupled to this denial is a contradiction 
with the evolutionary theory. Firstly, it requires that we see our identity in a more cosmic sense, 
as discussed above. But what this means, as Bookchin points out, is that we deny the fact that 
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there is something significantly different about the human species. Notably, Alasdair MacIntyre 
argues that the ecophilosophical system belittles the dignity and potential of humans because it 
does not contain a concept of a human telos. MacIntyre, denounces a “rights” based morality 
entirely.
76
  Or rather, as Daniel Dennett discusses in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, natural selection 
produced the marvel humanity. Bill Devall in a review of the long term goals of the deep ecology 
movement states, “To focus on the development of civility among the human species is not to 
inflate unduly the importance of humanity within the ecosystem of life on Earth; rather it is to 
recognize how dangerous the human race is to the viability of the Earth's ecosystem.”77 This 
passage and others of the like in many of the deep ecology writings reveal a logical 
inconsistency. The emphasis on the danger of the human species entails a uniqueness and even 
hierarchical understanding of the species. So while explicitly denying the uniqueness of the 
human species, the emphasis of the danger that we can cause entails a uniqueness to our species. 
Thus the underlying principles of radical ecology, particularly deep ecology can be summed up 
in following two statements: 1) the human species deserves no unique consideration because it is 
not any more significant than any other species; 2) the human species is unique in its ability to 
cause destruction to the rest of the nonhuman world and thus we must actively pursue methods of 
decreasing this uniquely dangerous species.    
Additionally, what is overlooked it that if the human species is not particularly special or 
unique or deserving extra consideration in this dismissal of hierarchical care as “speciesist,” then 
why should the species drastically reduce its numbers? One what grounds? As Daniel Dennett 
states, “If  ‘doing what comes naturally’ meant doing what virtually all nonhuman species do, it 
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would be hazardous to the health and well-being of us all.”78 The thinking of the wellbeing of the 
whole appears to conflict with certain evidence from an evolutionary standpoint. While it may 
benefit the “whole” to think in respect to how to preserve or conserve the wellbeing as a whole, 
the adaptive benefit of favouring one’s offspring or species may suggest otherwise. If humanity 
is no different or is given no consideration over other species, then how can we, as a species, be 
expected to act outside of adaptive benefits of natural selection? While, again, one could argue 
that it is in the best interest of the species as a whole to preserve the well-being of the planet (as I 
think it is) in order to maintain our species and for the potential good of the other species, this is 
an inherently anthropocentric appeal.
79
 One who is not a radical ecologist can argue with logical 
consistency that it is in the best interest of the human species that we reduce the population but 
the radical ecologist does not have this luxury. The underlying premise requires that we not act 
from human self-interest. David Waller, in “A Vegetarian Critique of Deep and Social Ecology” 
argues that rather than giving a solid argument for why we should kill as few animals as possible, 
deep ecology exploits our own feelings towards the animals, saying, “Its [deep ecology’s] 
proponents exploit our [emphasis added] sentiments toward animals in order to advance 
ecocentrism, but they refuse to address the qualities in animals that give rise to these feelings in 
us.
80
 While I do not agree with the thesis of his article, Waller’s point regarding the method to 
“preserving” animals is insightful. By appealing to our feelings in order to make the “case” for 
animals, this is an anthropocentric appeal – it is not a case for the animals for their own intrinsic 
worth. Likewise, it is rarely, as Waller continually points out, a case for the reduction of pain for 
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the animals, but simply to how we feel towards other species with whom we are meant to 
identify.
81
 This appeal to our emotions is the epitome of anthropocentrism, the very thing that 
deep ecology is desperately trying to shift.  
The denial of this uniqueness also threatens the benefit of radical ecology of breaking the 
constructed dualistic division between humanity and nature. In failing to recognize the properties 
of the species, a double-layered construction appears – by denying or misrepresenting aspects of 
the uniqueness of the human species, a false perception is presented. In this false representation I 
think it creates a further distance of the human’s place relation to the rest of the non-human 
world. The double-constructed nature of the radical ecologist approach is clarified in the 
following quotation from Naess: “I am not saying that we should have preserved the primordial 
forest as a whole, but looking back we can imagine a development such that, let us say, one third 
was preserved as wilderness, one third as free nature with mixed communities, which leaves one 
third for cities, paved roads, etc.”82 This division necessarily excludes or compartmentalizes 
members of the biotic community, distinctly setting culture “outside” of the natural world. 
Which makes it difficult to see how this segregation is any different than what Cronon critiques 
the transcendentalists of doing. Thus, while it is a double-layered segregation, it seems to be little 
more than a human-constructed oversimplification of the human species.  
III. Conclusion 
While they claim to offer “radical” approaches to shifting the paradigm the radical ecologists’ 
“solutions,” as a whole, rely on the denial of the uniqueness of the human species, rather than a 
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“radicalized” account of our place in the cosmos. However, this method of thinking does offer 
insightful and invaluable critiques of the historical and philosophical reasons for the current 
ecological crisis. Additionally it offers beneficial elements to our relationship with the nonhuman 
world, and interesting conceptual and philosophical experiments. However, the solution also 
rests on a logical inconsistency and denial of the human attributes of the human species. Thus, in 
order for the solutions (the primary one being the “stabilizing” of the human population) to the 
ecological crisis to be plausible and logically consistent, the underlying foundation must be 
readjusted with respect to the understanding of humanity.   
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Chapter 2: Biocentrism or Holistic Environmental Ethics 
I. The Problem with Anthropocentrism and the Need for a Biocentric Solution 
Biocentric environmental ethics works within existing ethical frameworks but seeks to extend the 
ethical community beyond that of the human species alone. As Callicott states, “it may be 
understood to be an application of well-established conventional philosophical categories to 
emergent practical environmental problems. On the other hand, it may be understood to be an 
exploration of alternative moral and even metaphysical principles, forced upon philosophy by 
the magnitude and recalcitrance of these problems.”83 Biocentric environmental ethics identifies 
anthropocentrism as the root cause of the environmental crisis but seeks to work towards a 
solution within existing ethical frameworks. This field endeavors to apply various existing 
ethical approaches to the rest of the nonhuman world. The biocentric environmental ethics, 
following the lead of Leopold, adhere to the Darwinian evolutionary theory as the foundation for 
ethics. While there are many different types of community-extending ethical approaches, this 
chapter will mainly deal with holistic biocentric ethics. However, I will briefly address 
individualistic approaches as well, to give clarity to the holistic approaches by means of contrast. 
A. Biocentric Holism  
1. Aldo Leopold 
Aldo Leopold’s Sand Country Almanac is a seminal work in the field of environmental 
ethics. Whether in varying degrees of agreement or with harsh disagreement Leopold’s “Land 
Ethic” is an oft sited text. The “Land Ethic” is the section in which he most clearly states his 
conservation view and method, but there are passages throughout the entire text that portray the 
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central ideas. Thus although, the his essay at the end of SCA, “Land Ethic,” is the most 
influential section, offering a practical approach to his environmental ethic, the work as a whole 
offers important insight into the ecological movement. As SAC is so influential within the 
community of environmental ethicists, it is worth touching on the main points within this work. 
The “Land Ethic” encourages a reinterpretation of the relationship of humanity with the 
rest of the natural world. There are many aspects of the “Land Ethic” that are important but two 
in particular stand out. First, Leopold naturalizes ethics. As he states, “The extension of ethics, so 
far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolution.”84 He re-grounds 
morality in the natural world. He argues from an evolutionary biological standpoint, while citing 
examples from history showing the evolution of human ethical attitudes or worldviews. He 
begins by referring to the hanging of slave girls by Odysseus upon Odysseus’ return from Troy. 
He argues that action, which would now be considered unjust, was considered justified, even 
moral behaviour, for a great warrior at the time. The reasons for which Leopold argues are 
because the slave girls were considered to be “outside” of the obligatory moral community. 
Since that time, we have extended the moral community to include all persons,
85
 as such we view 
Odysseus’ action as unjust and immoral. This change in attitude, Leopold argues shows that 
ethics evolve.
86
 Additionally, as the evolutionary theory suggests that humans have evolved the 
evolution of ethics is simply a natural process taking place within a natural species. Second, 
Leopold insists that our relationship with the natural world must shift from the view of nature as 
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“mechanistic other” to members of a biotic community. Individuals within the biotic community 
cannot be viewed solely with regards to their use to humans but must be encountered with 
respect as fellow members of the larger community. 
Although, Leopold insists upon the necessity of changing our view of nature as 
something of use to a community to which we belong, he still maintains some anthropic 
preferences. The following quotation cuts right to the heart of Leopold’s theory; “But we, who 
have lost our pigeons, mourn the loss. Had the funeral been ours, the pigeons would hardly have 
mourned us. In this fact […] lies objective evidence of our superiority over the beasts.”87 Implicit 
in this quotation is the difference between the human species and the other members of the biotic 
community. Although Leopold is typically interpreted as promoting the equal membership of all 
species in the community the fact that he notes that pigeons would not mourn is particularly 
telling. By noting the mourning element Leopold does not diminish the uniqueness of the human 
condition within the biotic community. Although we have to recognize the other members as 
members in order to know, love, and conserve, we must also not diminish the fact that it is only 
our species that does so. In doing so there is a justified preference of the human species over 
others in the biotic community.  
Even though he is frequently cited in environmental philosophical texts, Aldo Leopold is 
commonly understood as presenting a sentimental appeal for the need for a new approach to 
nature rather than contributing philosophically rigorous arguments.
88
 However, Michael P. 
Nelson argues that Leopold’s philosophical contribution is paradigm shifting, the full 
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implications of which are only now, starting to be understood. Nelson explains that Leopold 
argued that until conservation explored more philosophically significant and deep-probing 
questions regarding human existence and our relationship with nature, that it would not make 
appropriate headway.  By arguing that ethics do not exist in a vacuum, Nelson claims that our 
worldviews influence and “justifies” our actions. As long as society maintains the Modern 
mechanistic worldview, humanity can justify using natural resources and will not mourn the loss 
of a species. Leopold, with the aid of ecology, insists on the need for a new attitude towards 
nature, which understands humanity as a part of the biotic community as a whole. Thus non-
human species are worthy of our respect for their own sake. The insistence of Leopold on the 
necessity of changing the attitude of the relationship between humanity and nature allows for the 
birth of the discipline of environmental ethics prior to which had not been possible. Not only 
does Leopold contribute to the field of environmental ethics as a discipline but calls for a 
reinterpretation of how we view humanity as a whole. Nelson argues that it is not that Leopold 
did not make philosophical contributions through his Land Ethic but that the philosophical 
contributions were so paradigm shifting that we are just now starting to understand the full 
implication of his contributions.
89
  
Additionally, a common criticism of Leopold is that his “Land Ethic” is a fascist creed 
that “justifies” mistreatment of individuals. However, Nelson also defends Aldo Leopold’s 
“Land Ethic” and environmental holism in general, against the claim that they have fascist 
implications. He shows that environmental holism does not entail fascism. The arguments 
against an holistic approach to environmental ethics is as follows. The practical implications of 
an ethical theory that is primarily concerned with the well-being of the whole necessarily 
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excludes concern for the individual. Thus, the individual, including individual human beings, can 
be “justifiably” sacrificed for the greater good of the whole. Since Leopold argues that we must 
have concern for the well-being of the biotic community as a whole, his critics argue, he must 
necessarily overlook the well-being of the individuals within the biotic community. Furthermore, 
Nelson argues, the fascist argument, originated by Tom Regan, is not dissipated any, by the 
defenders of Leopold’s position (Callicott, Abbey, and Hardin) who encourage the good of the 
whole through the sacrifice of individuals, with statements such as, “I’m a humanist; I’d rather 
kill a man than a snake” (Abbey). However, Nelson argues that Leopold provides the evidence to 
show that he does not intend his “Land Ethic” to justify environmental fascism, nor does it entail 
it. He argues that Leopold’s focus on the holistic approach is actually a form of concern for the 
individual, as Nelson states, “we should protect and defend the whole because doing so would 
better insure individual survival.”90 Since the argument for a holistic approach is built upon the 
desire to better care for the individuals within it, Nelson argues that holistic approaches do not 
necessarily entail fascism. If there is any “ism” that can be applied to a holistic approach to 
environmentalism, it is communitarianism, as it emphasises the responsibility the individual has 
to the whole community rather than the subjugation or sacrifice of the individual for the good of 
the whole.   
Perhaps the best method of summarizing Leopold’s thought is to end with his own 
maxim: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”91 
2.  J. Baird Callicott 
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J. Baird Callicott must be considered both for his own thought and for his explication of 
the thought of Aldo Leopold, for he has made important contributions to both, and they inform 
each other.  
In “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold’s Land Ethic?” 
Callicott provides a paraphrasing of Leopold’s maxim: “A thing is right when it tends to disturb 
the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.”92 While, he acknowledges the criticism of Tom Birch and Holmes Rolston, III that 
this maxim is incomplete and requires some nuancing, Callicott argues that it is in the nature of 
pithy maxims that they be incomplete and require further explanation. Thus it is a good place to 
begin in understanding his thought. There are many assumptions entailed by this statement: 1) 
humanity is a part of the natural world, having evolved through natural selection, and thus the 
things that we do, inclusive of culture, are natural; 2) as actions that we perform and the culture 
that we build are natural they are therefore moral pursuits; 3) species extinction, is also a natural 
aspect of natural selection; 4) The main issue and thus the main immoral action of the human 
species within the biotic community, is not that we are causing other species to go extinct (see 
premise 3), but the scale and speed at which we are causing these extinctions. These assumptions 
will be explained in further detail below. 
In “The Conceptual Foundations of ‘The Land Ethic,’” Callicott argues that, contrary to 
the popular opinion of environmental philosophers, Leopold’s “Land Ethic” is not a work to be 
taken lightly nor with a tone of derision. The reason that it is too often chided by philosophers is 
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because the philosophy within is too, “abbreviated, unfamiliar, and radical.”93 Callicott examines 
and defends the rigorous underlying philosophical arguments in the “Land Ethic” in “The 
Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic.” He argues that the “Land Ethic” rests on three 
scientific principles: Copernican astronomy as the backdrop for ecological and evolutionary 
theory. Evolutionary theory provides a link of “kinship” between humans and other species, 
while, ecology lends a sense of community and social integration between all members of the 
biotic community. Copernican astronomy, “scales the Earth down to something like a cozy 
island paradise in a desert ocean.”94 From these three tenets of scientific thought, Leopold 
presents a holistic rather than individualistic notion of morality. Callicott argues that “The Land 
Ethic” is a deontological rather than a prudential ethic; we are duty bound to consider the well-
being of the entire biotic community, says Leopold. Notably, Callicott emphasizes the somewhat 
paradoxical nature of Leopold’s ethic; nature is not amoral.95 Because of the evolutionary theory 
underlying Leopold’s ethic which requires us to see ourselves, humanity, as a member of the 
community of the living inclusive of soil, birds, mammals, etc. this means that we are a part of 
nature and thus, significantly, humans as moral beings are a result of the evolutionary process. 
An issue which Darwin grappled with as Callicott explains:  
Human survival and reproductive success, Darwin argued, 
grappling with this conundrum [the apparent increase of ethical 
behaviour rather than the increase of selfish behaviour], is only 
possible in a social setting. . . . In short, if there is no ethics, there 
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is no community; if there is no community, there is no survival 
(and, more importantly, no reproduction).
96
  
Or as Callicott states regarding “The Land Ethic,” “The biosocial analysis of human moral 
behavior, in which the land ethic is grounded, is designed precisely to show that in fact 
intelligent moral behaviour is natural behaviour. Hence, we are moral beings not in spite of, but 
in accordance with, nature.”97 The emphasis of nature as moral and consistent with Darwinian 
evolution is perhaps the most significant part of the Callicott’s analysis of ‘The Land Ethic.’ 
However, the “naturalizing” of morality is not without problems and there are important tasks at 
hand as a result. 
The most important task for environmental ethics, Callicott argues, is a philosophically 
justifiable non-anthropocentric value theory. Without a non-anthropocentric justification of 
environmental ethics the whole movement collapses in on itself and must resort to normative 
ethics. Callicott discusses theism, holism, and sentimentalism as three possible justifications for 
a non-anthropocentric value theory. Most closely tied to the anthropocentric view of ethics is the 
hedonistic utilitarian argument. Callicott argues that it is inadequate as the basis for a non-
anthropocentric theory of environmental ethics as it necessarily excludes all non-sentient beings. 
Furthermore, it excludes the biosphere itself, as it is also insentient. Thus ethical hedonism must 
be rejected. Similarly, the theistic argument must be dismissed as, although it appears to side-
step the anthropocentric criticism by appealing to God, it is “essentially mythic, ambiguous, and 
inconsistent with modern science.”98 Likewise, the holistic argument that appeals to a Platonic 
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existence of “objective good” fails as justification for a non-anthropocentric theory. The problem 
that Callicott identifies with the holistic argument is that is provides no justification for why the 
good in itself should be valued; every attempt to do so ends up appealing to an anthropocentric 
concern. The non-anthropocentric value system must be able to account for the following: 
An adequate value theory for non-anthropocentric environmental 
ethics must provide for the intrinsic value of both individual 
organisms and a hierarchy of superorganismic entities – 
populations, species, biocoenoses, biomes, and the biosphere. It 
should provide differential intrinsic value for wild and domestic 
organisms and species. It must be conceptually concordant with 
modern evolutionary and ecological biology. And it must provide 
for the intrinsic value of our present ecosystem, its component 
parts and complement of species, not equal value for any 
ecosystem.
99
 
Conversely, Callicott argues that the moral sentient arguments are, by definition, “other-
oriented,” and thus can form the basis for a non-anthropocentric value theory, accounting for all 
of the above. The Humean ethic is intrinsically “other-oriented” and as such it is non-
anthropocentric, however, it is still human. As Callicott states, “the Darwin-Leopold 
environmental ethics, grounded in the axiology of Hume, is genuinely and straightforwardly non-
anthropocentric, since it provides for the intrinsic value of non-human natural entities.”100 
Callicott argues that we are genetically disposed to regard the earth and those within as part of 
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our tribe, genetically disposed to value and find community with the other species of the earth. 
However, it is a specifically human system, as we are “doing” the valuing.  
Strikingly, Callicott argues, “Since normal ethical theory is conventionally 
anthropocentric, no critical theoretical thinking needs to be done. Environmental ethics is thus 
reduced more or less to cost-benefit analyses and public policy considerations.”101 Callicott 
makes the important point that, “a new, revolutionary moral paradigm is no more created ex 
nihilo than a new, revolutionary scientific paradigm. Without some historical continuity, a new 
theory, natural or moral, could not be recognized as such.”102 This point both highlights his 
reasons for founding his ethics on Hume and simultaneously takes a shot at radical ecology. 
3. Holmes Rolston, III 
Holmes Rolston, III, in “Challenges in Environmental Ethics,” articulates that the central 
challenge of environmental ethics is the “attempt to redefine the boundaries of ethical 
obligations.” Similarly, in his lecture “The Ethical Imperatives of Wilderness,” Rolston states, 
“The question is, are we apart from or a part of wilderness?”103 He argues that life, inclusive of 
humans, sets up boundaries. So, what does this mean? How do we understand and reconcile 
human actions with the rest of the nonhuman realm? How are we to view culture; is it a part of 
the wild or an imposition upon it? How do we act morally towards those “outside” of our human 
culture? Rolston argues that the “is” and the “ought” are not so far apart after all. Or as he says it 
in “The Ethical Obligations of Wilderness,” seeing the natural beauty of American wilderness 
makes it easy to move from “is” to “ought.”104 However even with our environmental awareness 
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we still employ a semi-anthropic ethic which extends moral value to sheep and wales which 
implores us to act “humanely” towards them. Rolston identifies the underlying problem: how do 
we treat wild animals ethically with ethics that are learned/developed in culture, not in the wild? 
As Rolston says, “there is no value without an evaluator. . . . Its esse is percipi.”105 However, 
Rolston argues that value only exists in community. Because of this, the problem with 
anthropocentric value is that it rests on the assumption that humans are the only members of the 
community. Even though earth and its non-human community cannot reflect or understand 
values, they can still “claim their care.” While value is justified through our understanding of 
what is a “humane” manner of acting, Rolston, argues that it is possible, nay necessary,  to move 
beyond a strict anthropocentrism. Important to note: while ethics exist in community, Rolston 
does not favour “The Anthropocene.” 
Contrary to proponents of the Anthropocene, Holmes Rolston, III, in his article “The 
Anthropocene! Beyond the Natural?” argues that we need to deviate from the trajectory of a 
human cultivated planet and solve the human/ecological problem where it actually lies. As he 
states, “If our concern is for the poor in this new humanist excellence, then emphasize 
environmental justice, more equitable distribution of wealth between rich and poor on developed 
lands, rather than diminishing wild nature to benefit the poor. Solve the problem in the right 
place.”106 Furthermore, while advocates of the Anthropocene argue that “wild” nature does no 
longer exist and that the parks we create are equally as constructed as Disney Land. However, as 
Rolston queries, “Wilderness advocates may wonder if anyone who makes such a claim has ever 
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done a backcountry trek in Yellowstone or the Bob Marshall Wilderness.”107 Rolston agrees that 
humans are the dominant species and will continue to become increasingly dominating (for the 
time being). However, although we have a duty to each other within our human species, this 
dominating duty-bound species is not excluded from having ethical obligations to other species 
as well.  
Our obligation to others species is clearly articulated in his article “Ecology,” which 
discusses the field contained in the title. Rolston begins with a discussion of the meaning and 
evolution of the meaning of the term “ecology,” by showing the historical roots of the word itself 
and the way that ecology has evolved since it was first coined in 1866. Rolston then discusses the 
central tensions at the heart of ecology. The simple meaning of ecology is a science that studies 
organism-environment relations; a field which influences conversations in technology, science, 
philosophy, and ethics. Ecological ethics refers to “doing ethics” in light of what ecologist have 
found in their studies – encouraging humans to imitate the way ecologies function or considering 
ecosystems to be a foundational good to be valued and preserved. The environmental crisis refers 
to the assumed inherent value of ecosystems and the potential threat to them from pollution or 
otherwise. Thus ecology and ethics have teamed to encourage humans to live more sustainable 
lifestyles in harmony with nature. Main concepts in ecology rely on ecosystems. A term which 
Rolston defines as, “a succession of communities rejuvenated by disturbances, energy flow, 
niches and habitats, food chains and webs, carrying capacity, populations and survival rates, 
diversity, and stability.”108 Of central concern is the question of how much of human 
environmental policy can be drawn from ecology, from which are derived classical is/ought 
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concerns of moving from fact to value. Ecologists and their philosophical and ethical disciples 
challenge the is/ought division by arguing that there are values in nature that humans ought to 
consider and care for. As Rolston says, “ecology invites human beings to open their eyes and to 
appreciate realities that are valuable in ways humans ought to respect.”109 Ecology, as a 
discipline, assumes Hume’s problem of fact/value conflict is not a legitimate concern because if 
the ecosystem has value then we ought to preserve it. Thus the field of ecology itself assumes an 
ethical creed that steps beyond Humean ethics. Furthermore, while, our ethics have a distinctly 
human interpretation to them, ecosystems have a value that extends beyond our ability to 
manipulate or maintain them. 
Additionally, while it may sound like an anthropocentric appeal, Rolston argues that we 
need to cultivate and allow for the urban, the rural, and the wild to flourish and that in denying 
any aspect we are stunting elements of our humanity. As he states: 
“the more we become dominantly Anthropocene, the more we 
shrink to become one-dimensional, we hope for healthy people on 
a healthy planet. Alas, as likely a future as any on our present 
trajectory is a warmer, less biodiverse planet – weedier, more 
degraded, less sustainable, with a widening gap between rich and 
poor, with lives that are more artifacted, more artificial. We cannot 
be human without culture; that is our distinctive genius. Yet 
equally we do not want a denatured life on a denatured planet.”110 
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Additionally, Rolston points out that it is not that nature will cease to exist, but that we must 
quell our anti-ecological methods for our own sake. Nature will continue to exist long after the 
Anthropocene can thrive. As he states, “Nature has not ended and never will [. . .] wilderness 
will return to take what course it may. This ought not to serve as an excuse to continue our 
dominance; rather it should sober us into finding a more lasting fitness for humans on Earth.”111 
Rolston adheres to a Darwinian model for the foundation of his appeal to the inherent value and 
adaptivity of ecosystems. Or as Christopher J. Preston in Grounding Knowledge: Environment, 
Philosophy, Epistemology, and Place, explains that, “Rolston moves towards intrinsic and 
systemic values by arguing that in all cases people find nature value-able only because nature is 
something that is able-to-carry-value.”112  
4. Paul Taylor 
Taylor contrasts his life-centred ethics to the anthropocentric theory of ethics. He argues 
that we have a prima facie moral obligation to other life-forms such as plants and other animals 
themselves as members of the biotic community. In order to do so we have to reorder our 
understanding of the moral universe. Underlying Taylor’s attitude of respect for nature is a 
biocentric outlook of nature. The biocentric approach to nature is made up of the following four 
components: 1) humans are thought of as members of the earth’s community of life, holding that 
membership is on the same terms and applies to all the nonhuman members; 2) the earth’s 
natural ecosystems as a totality is seen as a complex interconnected web; 3) each individual 
organism is considered a teleological centre of life; 4) the claim that humans are superior to other 
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species if a groundless one and must be rejected in light of claims 1, 2, & 3.
113
 These four 
principles provide the base point from which we can start working towards resolving the 
environmental problems. They justify that we cannot proceed with a preference to our own 
species. Although, as Taylor admits, it will not be easy to place limits on human population and 
technology, it is within our power to do so and we are likewise duty-bound to try. Additionally, 
simply because it may be difficult to embody a respect for nature attitude this does not lesson the 
moral obligation to do so.  
B. Utilitarians Briefly Considered – Peter Singer and Tom Regan 
While the Utilitarians explicity state the framework that they are working from, they do 
provide insightful criticism for the holistic environmental ethics. In this chapter Singer examines 
and critiques two approaches to environmentalism. The first is the Western tradition grounded in 
Judeo and Aristotelian thought and integrated through the writings of Aquinas. This tradition, 
Singer argues, is anthropocentric and hierarchical and, although there are a few deviations, the 
dominant position is that humans have dominion over the natural world; a “right” given by God. 
Although this tradition can be harsh, it can still reveal a concern for the natural world. This can 
be done as long as the well-being of the natural-world contributes to human well-being i.e. the 
greenhouse effect could end up causing flooding in Nile delta possibly resulting in the loss of 
human life. Singer then asks whether we are morally obligated to extend ethics beyond sentient 
beings. Doing so comes with a host of difficulties. The first of which is that, without a conscious 
interest, we have no way of determining the weight that should be given to the flourishing of 
different life forms, as our value judgements usually come down to our own feelings. He 
similarly criticizes the deep ecology approach, as we have no way of knowing what it is like for 
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a biosphere to flourish. As such it has failed so far in providing convincing arguments in that 
direction. Singer’s own view of what an environmental ethics should looks like in broad terms, 
“fosters consideration for the interests of all sentient creatures, including subsequent generations 
stretching in the far future.”114 On a practical level this ethic 1) discourages large families; 2) 
measures success not through the accumulation of material goods but through the development 
of abilities and achievements; 3) eliminates extravagant environmentally harmful activities i.e. 
unnecessary long drives for pleasure etc. Essential to this ethic is that we reassess our notions of 
extravagance and emphasize frugality and the simple life, not denying pleasure but finding 
pleasure in “warm” relationships and activities consistent with the environmental flourishing. 
II. Analysis 
A. What are the Operative Moral Frameworks of the Biocentric Environmental 
Ethics Movement 
1. What must be Assumed to be True in Order for their Claims to be true? 
The fundamental assumption for biocentric environmental ethics is that Darwinian 
evolutionary theory provides an accurate and exhaustive picture of reality and thus that we are a 
product of natural selection. This assumption further entails that reason and morality are products 
of evolutionary adaptability. As such, the classical hierarchy of reason, will, passions, is a 
misrepresentation of the way that human ethics evolve or should be understood because our 
physical traits and adaptability defines or produces our moral inclinations and thus our ethical 
creeds.
115
 As Callicott states, “Hence, anthropogenic changes imposed on nature are no less 
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natural than any other. However, since Homo sapiens is a moral species, capable of ethical 
deliberation and conscientious choice, and evolutionary kinship and biotic community 
membership add a land ethic to our familiar social ethics, anthropogenic changes may be land-
ethically evaluated.”116 
Since our ethics are grounded in nature, another assumed truth is that nature is not 
amoral. Since these ethical guidelines are grounded in evolutionary adaptability as the 
foundation of ethics, this model provides the foundation for the ethical creed. As such, in the 
words of Aldo Leopold regarding ethical evolution, “[m]any historical events, hitherto explained 
solely in terms of human enterprise, were actually biotic, interactions between people and land. 
The characteristics of the land determined the facts quite as potently as the characteristics of the 
men who lived on it.”117  As J. Baird Callicott states in discussion of Leopold’s view of nature 
and morality; “The biosocial analysis of human moral behavior, in which the land ethic is 
grounded, is designed precisely to show that in fact intelligent moral behaviour is natural 
behaviour. Hence, we are moral beings not in spite of, but in accordance with, nature.”118 Thus 
“right” and moral actions and our knowledge of them are part of the natural process of the 
natural world.  
The emphasis on extending the moral community, like the radical ecology movement, is 
also critical of the over-simplistic mechanistic view of nature. As such, it also resists the dualist 
view of reality as the evolutionary story becomes the foundation and so places humanity firmly 
within the rest of the biotic community. The issues of this are described in detail in chapter one, 
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so I will not go into detail regarding the problems of dualistic view of reality. While radical 
ecology works to dispel the dualistic tension through sacralising or mysticizing the nonhuman 
world, biocentric environmental ethics seeks to dispel this dualism through scientific 
evolutionary means. By grounding ethics, particularly environmental ethics in the evolutionary 
narrative, this dispels any lingering division between the human and natural world. Thus one can 
argue, as Rolston does, that urban, rural, and wild life  are all needed for the wellbeing of three 
dimensional humanity.  
Callicott is right to point out that simply because our genes are selfish, this does not mean 
that we are selfish; to claim such is to commit the fallacy of composition.
119
 However, his 
method does provide a way of legitimizing a “favouring” of those closer to you which solves the 
problems of deep ecology, in some respects. “And, from the same cosmic point of view, we do in 
fact depend on our existence – with every breath we take, with every morsel of food we eat – on 
our fellow voyagers in the odyssey of evolution.”120 As discussed in chapter one (see pages 23-
24) there are issues with the scale of the radical ecology movement in its solutions that undercut 
or try to step outside of our subjectivity as humans. The emphasis of holistic environmental 
ethics on the adaptive benefits of morality allows for the preference or protection of one’s 
offspring and the importance of place in a manner which radical ecology does not.
121
 Resting on 
the notion of natural selection, the holistic environmental ethics framework first is legitimate in 
their claims that human actions are good, and second that even such results as the extinction of 
other species is not necessarily a bad thing. If humans and their ethical codes are a product of 
                                                          
119
 Although, perhaps it is more accurate to say that our genes are persistent rather than selfish. 
120
 J. Baird Callicott, “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold’s Land Ethic?,” 154. 
121
 Of course, as argued by Callicott in “The Conceptual Foundation of the Land Ethic,” we are encouraged through 
Copernican astronomy to see the world as a “cozy home,” and thus care for the well-being of the whole, however 
this concern for the whole does not necessitate that we are not legitimately allowed to show preference for those in 
close proximity.  
64 
 
evolution and the natural world is not evil then the actions of humans must also be considered 
good in the same respect, when acting in accordance with the adaptive/evolutionary process. In 
this respect, holistic environmental ethics “solves” the underlying contradiction of the radical 
ecology movement. But further than this it is the acknowledgment that when we act within a 
natural human scale that our actions are moral, even if they do result in the loss of some other 
species’ lives in the building of homes, cities, farms, etc., thus showing that humans are part of 
the natural world. Additionally, the biocentric environmental ethic view does not entail a false 
dualistic us/them relationship between humans and the natural. As such it is consistent 
evolutionary picture of the world and as such consistent with science. As Callicott states, “Once 
again, it’s a question of scale. . . . The problem with anthropogenic perturbations – such as 
industrial forestry and agriculture, exurban development, drift net fishing, and such – is that they 
are far more frequent, widespread, and regularly occurring than are nonanthropogenic 
perturbations.”122 It is only the massive rate at which we are causing death and extinction of 
species and ecosystems that is at issue and thus immoral. 
B. What are the Implications and Possible Problems for the Biocentric 
Environmental Ethics Frameworks 
1. The Benefit of the Biocentric Environmental Ethic to the Human Species 
What I consider to be the greatest benefit of the biocentric conversation, particularly Callicott’s 
contribution is the mentioning of the “scale” of the anthropogenic travesties. He makes a very 
important distinction between the actions of humans and the large scale, perhaps even beyond 
the human scale. Rolston makes a similar point with his emphasis on the necessity of the 
preservation of all types of landscape for the wellbeing of three dimensional persons. The 
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holistic approach to environmental ethics emphasizes that the creation of culture and human 
changes to the landscape are not to be stopped or immoral: Rolston by arguing that all urban, 
rural, and wild landscapes are necessary for the three dimensional person and Callicott by saying 
that it is simply the scale at which we are changing the landscape which is the issue. The current 
rate of species extinction is bad.
123
 Rolston’s emphasis on the solving the problem where it lies, 
of actually helping the poor makes a similar and important point. The main “good” to be 
preserved is the natural scale sizes. Radical ecology, particularly deep ecology, tended to vilify 
human actions which resulted in contradictions, whereas the emphasis of the goodness of natural 
human scales, a scale that preserves natural scope of the species avoids the radical ecology 
altogether.  
2. The Cost of the Biocentric Environmental Ethics and Internal Logical Issues 
The effort to ground environmental ethics in the Hume/Darwinian/Leopold model 
appears to work off of the evolutionary inductive method, however, there are some inherent 
problems contained within it. Firstly, the nature of induction is that it can only be proved false, 
thus as the bases for a theory of an ethical framework, it entails inconsistency. This eventually 
leads to a dogmatic claim for morality. Or if it is not, it is difficult to see how this type of ethics 
does not rest on dogmatism. The foundation must adhere to the principle that only logical 
certainty is that which can be falsified as falsifiability is the only certainty in the scientific 
method. However this model asserts that ethics is always evolving. This problem is discussed 
further below.   
In discussion of the “type” of ethic needed for a plausible environmental ethic, Callicott, 
discusses both Platonic conceptions of the “good” and Christian ethics. While, he admits that 
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they would solve the problem of a foundation for a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic, he 
ultimately dismisses both frameworks. The first, which he refers to as holistic “rationalism,” 
Callicott rejects because, although there is a standard of good it necessarily undermines the value 
of the individual;
124
 the latter because it is “outdated and anti-scientific.”125 However, the 
problem with dismissing any exterior appeal for the grounding of ethics is that the foundation for 
ethics becomes solely fact based, which ends up baring a striking resemblance to the ethics of 
Hume, indeed, Callicott explicitly appeals to Hume as the foundation for his ethics. Consider the 
following quotation from Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, “Men are 
now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to 
no arguments but those which are derived from experience. It is full time they should attempt a 
like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or 
ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation.”126 This claim is essentially the same 
that Callicott makes in his rejection of classical appeals to or notions of “the good” and in his 
explanation of Leopold’s “Land Ethic.” Both the HEE and Hume use fact as the foundation of 
their ethical frameworks. While it is beneficial as it provides a parsimonious base framework that 
is consistent with an evolutionary view of reality, this model is not without its problems.  
The problems with Hume’s ethics and the holistic environmental ethics are made 
apparent by Kant’s criticism. In the “Introduction” to his Critique of Pure Reason Kant discusses 
the problem between synthetic and analytic propositions on which the Critique dwells for the 
remaining pages. In this introduction, Kant says the following about David Hume: 
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“David Hume came nearest to envisioning this [problem between 
synthetic and analytic], but still was very far from conceiving it 
with sufficient definitiveness and universality. . . . If we accept his 
conclusions, then all that we call metaphysics is a mere delusion 
whereby we fancy ourselves to have rational insight into what, in 
actual fact, is borrowed solely from experience, and under the 
influence of custom has taken the illusory semblance of 
necessity.
127
 
This criticism of Hume by Kant, with nuances, can be applied to the Callicott/Leopold model as 
well. First, as stated above, the ethics in this model are said to be evolving (see example of 
Odysseus and the slave girls) and as such the claim is not for an objective morality as such. So 
one may try and argue that the objection does not stand as the moral code is not claiming any sort 
of “necessity.” However, there are problems with this type of reply and ultimately the criticism 
stands. The Callicott/Leopold model falls into the same error as the Logical Positivists with their 
“verification principle:” the same problem as David Hume. How can we infer the “ought” from 
the “is?” Their model entails logical incoherence in the statement of moral truths. For although 
Callicott appeals to the inherent goodness of the concern for “otherness” as the foundation for his 
ethics, there is no reason supplied for why being concerned for others is necessarily a good thing. 
While I agree, that concern for others’ wellbeing is a good thing, Callicott’s simple assertion that 
this notion is the foundation of his ethics does not make it necessarily good.  
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The issue for the Callicott/Leopold model is that, while it may not perpetuate the 
fact/value distinction he argues that the facts are the foundation for the value; the “is” produces 
the “ought.” Consider the following argument from Callicott: 
Why therefore are anthropogenic clear cuts, beach developments, 
hydroelectric impoundments, and the like environmentally 
unethical? As such, they are not. Once again, it’s a question of 
scale. . . . The problem with anthropogenic perturbations – such as 
industrial forestry and agriculture, exurban development, drift net 
fishing, and such – is that they are far more frequent, widespread, 
and regularly occurring than are nonanthropogenic 
perturbations.
128
 
In the above passage, Callicott definitively states that the problem with human changes to the 
landscape is that they are being done at an unprecedented large scale and that scale is immoral. 
While I happen to agree with him in the judgement in the immorality of the scale, his reasoning 
is problematic. This statement appeals to some sort of objective or external standard of truth. 
One can observably say that this type of action is unprecedented, but then to condemn it as 
immoral makes a judgment beyond what is observable. Presumably there are those who would 
disagree with that statement as well – those making profits off of this type of mass subjugation of 
the natural world for example – thus to call out their actions as immoral, one has to appeal to 
something other than the facts. However, Callicott already dismissed any notion of “goodness” 
beyond the working of natural selection as a legitimate appeal. One cannot begin with induction 
as the foundation or framework for ethics and end up with statements like “this action is 
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immoral.” Again, while I agree with Callicott in many of his conclusions, it appears that the 
rational he uses in getting to them is little more than a dogmatic assertion that some actions are 
good and others are not.  
The above discussion of the Kantian critique of Hume in reference to criticism of 
Callicott is relevant for two reasons. First, Kant anachronistically provides legitimate and 
concerning objections to Callicott’s position. Second Rolston and Taylor’s position, where it 
differs from the Leopold/Callicott model, is built upon a Kantian framework, so the introduction 
of Kantian ethics helps to highlight the objections to Rolston/Taylor below. 
The Rolston model, while it follows some aspects of the Darwinian model adheres to a 
more Kantian duty ethic than an empirical adaptability model. Rolston, begins his article 
“Challenges in Environmental Ethics” by arguing that the “is” and “ought” are not so far away in 
the moral realm by appealing to a duty that we have as humans to act morally towards the rest of 
the biotic community. Rolston’s method or ethical framework is a duty based ethic. One cannot 
help but think of Kant when “duty” and “ethics” are coupled. Rolston appeals to the intrinsic 
value of all species as the duty to act morally towards the rest of the biotic community.
129
 One 
could argue that Kant makes the exact opposite appeal, especially as he begins his duty ethic in 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals with the following statement: “There is no possibility 
of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good 
without qualification, except a good will.”130 However, the method of justification for their 
respective duty ethics is strikingly similar. Consider the following statement from Kant, “all 
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imperatives are expressed by an ought and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of 
reason to a will that is not necessarily determined by this law because of its subjective 
constitution (the relation of necessitation).”131 The appeal to the “ought” is frequently made by 
both Kant and Rolston throughout their respective ethics. However, the similarity in method is 
made apparent through the following quotation from Kant: 
And just in this  lies the paradox that merely the dignity of 
humanity as rational nature without any further end or advantage to 
be thereby gained – and hence respect for a mere idea – should yet 
serve as an inflexible precept for the will; and that just this very 
independence of maxims from all such incentives should constitute 
the sublimity of maxims and the worthiness of every rational 
subject to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends, for 
otherwise he would have to be regarded as subject only to the 
natural law of his own needs.
132
 
This lengthy quotation contains many key concepts for the justification of Kant’s ethic and 
undeniable similarities to Rolston’s Kantian environmental ethic, as well as some important 
differences. Explicitly, this passage states that Kant’s ethic is anti-consequentialist; regardless of 
the outcome, members of the rational community are owed respect, for simply being the type of 
being that they are.
133
 If the rational member is not owed respect then it may be treated as simply 
a means or something to be used like the natural non-human world. There are two very important 
things to note: 1) the intrinsic value and consequent duty that the members within have to act 
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morally to those members within that specific community; 2) Kant considers it morally 
permissible to “use” those who do not hold “rational membership.” Rolston appeals to the notion 
of intrinsic value as the justification for his environmental ethics. In his method of argument, the 
duty that we have to act morally is the same as Kant’s appeal. Consider: “we always shape our 
values in significant measure in accord with our notion of the kind of universe that we live in, 
and this drives our sense of duty.”134 
 What is excellent about Rolston, is that he, in some senses, obliterates the is/ought 
distinction, which is certainly a beneficial element to his moral theory. However, it is difficult to 
see what he is grounding his theory in, as he takes natural selection as the starting ground. 
Rolston, wishing to avoid the problem that the Leopold/Callicott model entails, through his 
appeal to the intrinsic value, appeals to a Kantian version of intrinsic value. Otherwise, he is left 
in the position of simply asserting that the natural world is good just because it is.  
Others would argue that a Kantian ethic provides a plausible and coherent foundation for 
environmental ethics. For example, John Martin Gillroy argues that Immanuel Kant provides an 
environmental ethic that contributes to the two separate debates within the current environmental 
ethic conversation. He argues that Kant’s theory of autonomy should be at the heart of 
environmental policy making as it defines the human duties to both nature and humanity through 
its focus on inherent worth. Likewise, the Kantian environmental ethic is comprehensive as it 
supports the conservation of resources for human perfection as well as promoting intrinsically 
valuable components of ecosystems.
135
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While it is helpful to ground Rolston’s ethic in a classical framework, with all of the 
support that history offers, the problems or challenges that accompany Kantian ethics accompany 
Rolston’s method as well. As Alasdair MacIntyre states, “So ‘Keep your promises throughout 
your entire life except on’, ‘Persecute all those who old false religious beliefs’ and ‘Always eat 
mussels on Mondays in March’ will all pass Kant’s test, for all can be consistently 
universalized.”136 And, while eating mussels on Mondays actually sounds like a great addition to 
universal morality claims, it illustrates the inherent problems with a morality based on the 
categorical imperative; simply because we all may wish to make something a universal law, does 
necessitate that that law or wish is actually good. However, there is a far deeper problem with 
Kantian ethics as the foundation for a biocentric environmental ethic.  
Kant’s notion of the inherent value or worth of rational beings is our capacity for a priori 
reasoning. A priori knowledge provides the unifying concepts with which we understand the 
empirical world. Kant’s argument for the ability of reason to understand the empirical world is 
built upon the recognition that there is a fundamental difference between humans and the other 
species; reason is a faculty singular to humans that gives us the ability to understand the rest of 
the empirical world. As he states in the Critique:  
But the law of nature is just this, that nothing takes place without a 
cause sufficiently determined a priori. The proposition that no 
causality is possible save in accordance with laws of nature, when 
taken in unlimited universality, is therefore self-contradictory; and 
this cannot, therefore, be regarded as the sole kind of causality. . . . 
This is transcendental freedom, without which, even in the 
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[ordinary] course of nature, the series of appearances on the side of 
the causes can never be complete.
137
 
The very foundation for our ability to understand the natural world, on which his ethics is built, 
is that we, as rational creatures, are distinct from the rest of the natural world. Furthermore, 
although Kant does argue that morality must be lived, it cannot be known in any empirical 
manner. However, that claim goes against the foundational assumption of the environmental 
ethics worldview: humans have evolved through natural processes and are not distinct from the 
natural world. Biocentric environmental ethics seeks to dispel the distinction of humanity as the 
foundation for their ethics but this distinction is precisely what Kantian ethics is built upon.
138
 
Thus an attempt to resolve the problems that come from a Humean ethic by shifting to a Kantian 
framework, still entail all of the potential issues with Kantian morality, but also bring more 
problems to the table. Extending the community in the Kantian ethics to include all of the biotic 
community either forces abilities on species that they do not have or entail us to necessarily 
exclude some species or existing elements of the biotic community from moral responsibility. 
Kantian ethics provides the reason for why we must act morally however, it rests on the 
distinctness of humanity. If we are to dismiss anthropocentrism and appeal to a biocentric 
foundation for ethics, the Kantian framework needs to establish a reason other than the capacity 
for reason to act morally. At the very least, it must give a reason not to treat nature as simply a 
means, as the justification for treating persons as members of the “kingdom of ends” rest on the 
notion of pure reason. While this may be possible, within a Kantian environmental ethic, such a 
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framework requires more nuance and thought to bring about an “ends” justification of the natural 
world.  
III. Conclusion 
The biocentric environmental ethics movements rest on the foundation of the Darwinian 
evolutionary theory. These ethical frameworks, working within existing ethical models, largely 
adhere to David Hume’s or Immanuel Kant’s moral theories. While there is certainly some 
elements of these theories that are beneficial to thinking about environmental issues shifting 
from anthropocentric moral theories to biocentric theories entail issues with these shifts, as many 
of the foundational reasons are inherently anthropocentric, and as such entail logical 
inconsistencies or at the very least problems that require further thought. Additionally, while I 
agree with many of the criticisms of current human actions and many of the conclusions put 
forward in these theories, the foundational logical structure requires shifting in order to stand up 
to rational scrutiny, particularly the Hume/Leopold/Callicott foundation as explained above. 
However, the emphasis of the goodness of the natural scale is a crucial point in the development 
of a plausible environmental ethic that must not be downplayed.  
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Chapter 3: Shifting the Moral Structure for the Environmental Ethics: Re-Thinking the 
Human Factor 
“Men did not love Rome because she was great. She was great because they had loved her.” 
- G.K. Chesterton. 
I. Should We Reconsider the Human Element? 
This chapter considers and adopts the ideas of four different thinkers and applies them to 
central concerns from left over from chapters 1 and 2. The thinkers in this section are not all 
environmental philosophers, however their ideas present possibilities for resolving the conflicts 
of the radical ecology and environmental ethics frameworks. While these writers discuss 
different topics from global economy to the scientific method to the history of the English 
countryside, the central theme that undergirds each of their texts is the focus on some aspect of 
the uniqueness and importance of the human species. It is not a dwelling on the human species as 
a method of dismissing the importance, intrinsic value, or beauty of other members of the biotic 
community, but an embrace of our species and the qualities we have in the recognition of our 
subjectivity that we cannot step outside. Thus in order to present a plausible and coherent 
environmental ethic, we must recognize humanity’s qualities and abilities: recall, the problems 
left over from Chapters One and Two were a result of too hasty a dismissal of the human species 
or of some of our attributes.  
A. Aldo Leopold Reconsidered with Notes from Berthold-Bond 
While Leopold is commonly lauded as articulating the necessity of a new interpretation of ethics 
to incorporate the “land ethic,” perhaps his most significant contribution is his emphasis on the 
necessity of humans to live in and love the land that should be maintained. This point is 
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commonly overlooked or dismissed as a naïve appeal to sentimentality;
139
 however, this 
sentimentality is of central importance and lends coherence to his theory in The Sand County 
Almanac as a whole. Of central importance is his distinction that we mourn the loss of a species. 
While the emphasis is often put on Leopold’s insistence of the extension of moral obligation to 
include the whole biotic community, his point that the human species is unique is commonly 
overlooked: an oversight that can cause the breakdown of his whole approach to a land ethic. 
There are many places through A Sand Country Almanac in which Leopold appeals to the human 
capacity of love. In reference to Leopold’s Sand Country Almanac, John Gatta says, “Leopold 
expressed the heartfelt sentiments of a distinctly defined personality who loved a certain plot of 
land in Wisconsin and could not live without knowing wild things.”140 He continues by saying, 
“developing a right relation to land meant enlarging one’s capacity to love. Stirring this impulse 
to love was, of course, crucial to Leopold’s rhetorical purpose in the Almanac.”141 Gatta’s 
emphasis on the importance of love as central to Leopold’s land ethic is accurate. For there are 
many times throughout that Leopold makes this appeal, as in the following quotation: 
For one species to mourn the death of another is a new thing under 
the sun. The Cro-Magnon who slew the last mammoth thought 
only of steaks. . . . But we, who have lost our pigeons, mourn the 
loss. Had the funeral been ours, the pigeons would hardly have 
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mourned us. In this fact [. . .] lies objective evidence of our 
superiority over the beasts.
142
  
There are three essential things to note from this passage. First, Leopold emphasises our 
mourning of the loss because we love the pigeons. Second, entailed by this, working from the 
Darwinian model is the fact that we are in community, or to use Leopold’s term, “kinship” with 
the pigeons. Third, and what is most commonly overlooked, is that although, we are in 
community with the other species, Leopold does explicitly say that there is a natural hierarchy of 
species and places humanity, because of our unique ability to feel sadness over the loss of 
another species, at the top.  
Another telling story from SCA is from his chapter “Thinking Like a Mountain,” in which 
he recalls the shooting of the wolves for the “sake” of the deer. Upon encountering the dying 
wolf, Leopold says, “We reached the old wolf in time to watch a fierce green fire dying in her 
eyes. I realised then, and have known ever since, that there was something new to me in those 
eyes – something known only to her and the mountain.”143 Leopold continues to explain how that 
encounter with the wolf, dying by his own hand, changed how he viewed the ecology of the 
mountain. But what is essential is that it was an encounter of individuals – he needed to see the 
wolf and recognise the life slipping from her in a personal encounter in order to understand the 
significance of the useless death. In the abstract, he was happy to go about shooting wolves for 
the “sake” of the deer population. The personal interaction with the life of the wolf allowed 
Leopold to see and recognize the value of that life. While it is a love that is manifested through 
living in a place, thus creating a knowledge of the places that are to be preserved, it is a love that 
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can only be developed through this knowledge and in knowing and living the love deepens – it is 
a natural growth of knowledge and affection. 
Of central importance to this appeal of love it that it is a personal love of places and 
species that is at the heart of the land ethics. It is a mutual giving and receiving of knowledge and 
love but can only be done within the bounds of our experience and personal interactions. 
Because of the personal love at the centre of this land ethic, the scale of the endeavor must 
remain to a human scale. As soon as the process or the framework exceeds our capacity to know 
on the human scale the proportions get lost and the nucleus of the land ethics gets shifted to the 
sidelines or lost in the renovation. However, when this happens, the logic of the land ethic, as the 
centre is off balance, becomes incoherent and the farther it exceeds the scale the more incoherent 
it becomes. At this juncture the appeal to human scale sounds like a quaint appeal but with little 
philosophical foundation, however, there are several key concepts from the thinkers examined 
below that provide philosophical clout to this claim.  
In “The Ethics of ‘Place’: Reflections on bioregionalism,” Berthold-Bond discusses 
bioregional theory with regards to aspects of Leopold’s SCA in order to establish a plausible 
foundation for environmental ethics. He argues that environmental ethics has become a 
“subversive philosophy of space.” Biocentric theories of environmental ethics, as opposed to 
anthropocentric ones, “dis-place” humans from their positions as the possessors of value and that 
we are just a part of a community of nature – a community which is inherently valuable as a 
whole.
144
 Since biocentric theories of environmental ethics are essentially about philosophies of 
place, bioregionalism is concerned with, “locating place more precisely and concretely.”145 As a 
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theory, bioregionalism calls us to question the political systems that mask their pillaging of the 
environment and to “re-place” the politics of ecology. It is a call to “live in a place,” rather than 
to “live placelessly.” “Living-in-place,” although a call to nature, easily gets romanticized and 
can turn to a worship of the laws of nature or view nature as the guide. Essential to “living-in-
place,” Berthold-Bond argues is the human element, the creative, meaning imposing, subjects 
who interact with nature to create a “place.”146 The subject is essential to the definition of place, 
and consequently bioregionalism, as it is the subject working within the natural context which 
creates the place initially. Berthold-Bond quotes Dodge, saying, “the very gut of bioregional 
thought is the integrity of natural systems and culture, with the function of culture being the 
mediation of the self and the ecosystem.”147 However quite often, Berthold-Bond argues theories 
can swing too far from the consideration of nature’s laws and look solely to the cultural aspect of 
place to define “living-in-place.” A method that is equally as problematic as it’s opposite.148  
Finally, Berthold-Bond argues that the elusive nature of the definition of “place” or 
“region” within bioregionalism is because it is itself a relational structure; “it comes into being as 
a response of inhabitants to the landscape in which they dwell.”149 Because of the relational 
nature of regions, there can be no purely objective definition as places are never static. Place is 
never “finished,” as the response of inhabitants to the landscape can never be predicted. Place is 
therefore inherently vague, a, “quality without name,” as Berthold-Bond quotes Christopher 
Alexander.  
Although Berthold-Bond does criticize the romanticizing of nature in the theories of 
some bioregional literature, he argues, the spiritual nature that Leopold emphasizes in “Sketches” 
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is not necessarily a part of this romanticizing. Conversely, Berthold-Bond maintains that 
bioregionalists are interested in the spiritual redemption of the individuals through their 
connection/immersion in a place. Bioregionalism calls for a fundamental paradigm shift in the 
way in which we interact and view nature whose success is achieved through even one 
individual’s life becoming more fulfilled. In this manner, Berthold-Bond claims, Leopold is 
correct in emphasizing the spiritual component to one’s immersion in the land. By experiencing 
places, as a space of mystery, a place which cannot easily be understood, where there is 
“something to learn”; “he seeks to learn a different way . . . . where in order to know the marsh 
we objectify it and hence become blind to it, but by digging himself into it, by giving himself 
over to it. As such, he becomes transformed.”150 Therefore, the interaction of the person with 
place is not only essential to our understanding and definition of region or place, but also, our 
identity as persons becomes transformed through our interaction with places. It is a constant give 
and take by which places and persons exist in a condition of ever becoming through their 
relationship.
151
 
B. Small is Beautiful: The Need for the Human Scale 
1. E.F Schumacher 
E. F. Schumacher provides a thorough and convincing argument for the value and 
necessity of maintaining a human scale in order to establish a genuine and plausible economy. 
He begins his work Small is Beautiful with reference to a 1930 address by economist Lord 
Keynes which proposed that, “the day might not be far off when everybody would be rich” 
however, he cautioned that time is not yet, instead, “For at least another hundred years we must 
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pretend to ourselves and to every one that fair is foul and foul is fair; precaution must be our 
gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into 
daylight.”152 Keynes argues that in order for the world to be rid of poverty we must overturn 
morality and create wealth with no regard for the means by which we do so. Schumacher in 
Small is Beautiful argues against Keynes claiming it is not possible for a nation build on wealth 
to ever have enough. What is enough? Schumacher asks; “There are poor societies which have 
too little; but where is the rich society that says: ‘Halt! We have enough’? There is none.”153 
Small is Beautiful shifts the focus of economics from concern over the amalgamation of wealth 
to a concern over the well-being of humanity as a whole and considers the philosophical 
approaches to ecology, politics, and economies that are necessary in order to do so. 
Schumacher’s chapter “Development” analyses the phenomenon of developing countries. 
The two largest sources of concern in developing nations, he argues, are mass unemployment 
and mass migration to cities. Many look at the problem and recognize the need, but then suggest 
that the solution lies in more aid.
154
 However, Schumacher argues that the root of the problem 
lies in the “dual” economy that exists in these countries; two completely distinct ways of life 
existing side by side. The humblest income of the “modern sector” consisting of roughly fifteen 
percent of the population far exceeds the possible income of the most diligent of the other eighty-
five percent. The concept of evolution, Schumacher argues has influenced all areas of thought, 
except for development economics. In development economics we still think in terms of 
creation. Doing so, fixes the recipient of aid as a material object that can be “planned and 
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scheduled and purchased with money.”155 Undoubtedly, he argues, the problem lies with poverty. 
However, Schumacher argues that the level of poverty “degrades and stultifies the human 
person” and thus the problem cannot be fixed solely with goods. The real solution “starts with 
people and their education.”156 He argues that until we have concern for the person as the whole 
person and not simply for their material needs that the possibility of their economic growth will 
remain latent.
157
  
Schumacher argues that in our excitement over our scientific and technological 
capability, we have built a system of production that, “ravishes nature and a type of society that 
mutilates man.”158 Commonly the solution is regarded as one of money; if we had more money, 
then we could solve the problems that we face. This system that we have built places the 
accumulation of wealth as the highest goal, the pursuit of which can “justify” any action. In 
regards, to the second development decade Schumacher states “[it] will be no better than those of 
the first unless there is a conscious and determined shift of emphasis from goods to people. 
Indeed, without such a shift the results of aid will become increasingly destructive.”159 Although 
he is speaking specifically towards the growth of economies in developing countries in this 
passage, this principle is applied to his theory through Small is Beautiful. Until the primary 
concern of our society shifts from the production and accumulation of wealth to the well-being 
of those dwelling within, we will continue to wreak havoc on and exploit the land and its more 
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vulnerable members. Thus our society instead of being focused on the actual needs of humanity 
is built upon greed and the material wants of a few at the cost of the dignity, value, and humanity 
of the many.  
2. Oliver Rackham & Robert MacFarlane 
Through his exploration of the history of the English countryside, Oliver Rackham raises 
some significant issues and key concepts to developing a plausible and practical environmental 
ethic. In The History of the Countryside, he states, “Tree-planting is not synonymous with 
conservation; it is an admission that conservation has failed.”160 At the beginning of the chapter, 
“Conservation,” from which this sentence is taken, Rackham explains that there are four types of 
losses that the landscape undergoes: 1) the loss of beauty, “especially that exquisite beauty of the 
small and complex and unexpected, of frog-orchids or sundews or dragonflies;”161 2) loss of 
freedom; 3) loss of historic vegetation; 4) and the loss about which he is the most concerned, the 
loss of meaning.
162
 Citing historical texts and the continuation of the countryside in France and 
other countries, Rackham argues that the cause of the loss of meaning and landscapes is not 
necessity or human need. Instead, Rackham argues that it is monetary gain and the “blight of 
tidiness” which result in the loss of landscapes. As the “meaning infusing” species, we have 
shifted the value of profits over meaning with regards to the countryside in the United Kingdom. 
Thus his point, in regards to the planting of trees being the failure of conservation, is the 
manifestation of money being valued over meaning and nature itself until we are driven to the 
point of this recognition and driven to the point of needing to re-plant: it emphasises the point 
that the land has already lost meaning.  
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In reference to the four losses that Rackham distinguished in his History of the 
Countryside, Robert MacFarlane says the following, “Oliver Rackham describes four ways in 
which ‘landscape is lost’ . . . . I admire the way that aesthetics, human experience, ecology and 
semantics are given parity in his list. Of these losses the last is hardest to measure. But it is clear 
that there is now less need to know in detail the terrains beyond our towns and cities, unless our 
relationships with them are in some way professionally or recreationally specialized.”163 By 
dwelling on the language of places, MacFarlane builds on Rackham’s expression of the loss of 
meaning of landscapes. The use of language, the naming of places, cultivates a knowledge and 
love of place that allows for the possibility of conservation. Macfarlane is not naïve in thinking 
that words will magically inspire or re-enchant a population to become naturalists, but, as he 
states, “Rather that they might offer a vocabulary which is ‘convivial’ as the philosopher Ivan 
Illich intended the word – meaning enriching of life, stimulating to the imagination and 
‘encouraging creative relations between people, and people and nature’.”164 The emphasis on 
language, is the necessary first step in cultivating a harmonious relationship between humans and 
the nonhuman world and rests heavily on our ability to find meaning and gives names to the 
nonhuman places in which we dwell.  
In his anthologizing of place-terms, MacFarlane highlights the connection between the 
instilling of meaning and the affection we derive from the knowledge of places. The following 
quotation makes the point that it is not a homogenous “environment” that we are working to save 
but different and particular places and because of these different particulars it must be particular 
and individual loves – rather than a commitment to the preservation of “nature” while abusing 
the particular places, as he states, “For there is no single mountain language, but a range of 
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mountain languages; no one coastal language, but a fractal of coastal languages; no lone tree 
language, but a forest of tree languages.”165 This difference is also addressed in Rackham’s point 
on the deterioration of the English countryside. It is the meaning and the language as connected 
to the people living there who can instill and derive meaning from landscapes. Or as Macfarlane 
beautifully articulates, “To celebrate the lexis of landscape is not nostalgic, but urgent. . . . to 
defend what we love we need a particularizing language, for we love what we particularly 
know.’”166  
3. P.B. Medawar & the Human Aspect of Induction 
As the evolutionary theory and the naturalization of ethics is the foundation of the 
morality and the basis for an environmental ethics in chapter 2, it is worth looking at P. B. 
Medawar’s The Uniqueness of the Individual, particularly his chapter “A Note on ‘The Scientific 
Method.’” Medawar argues that what is of great interest to scientists is that hypotheses get 
“devised” at all. He states, “Its creation is evidently a leap upstream of the flow of deductive 
inference. One does not, as writers of detective fiction stories seem to imagine, deduce 
hypotheses; quite the reverse, hypotheses are what we deduce things from.”167 He continues with 
the following, “The creation of an hypothesis is akin to, and just as obscure in origins as, any 
other creative act of the mind. If science were an art we should call it inspiration, but as only 
astronomy has a Muse that will not do.”168 Medawar argues that the hypothesis comes from a 
creative act of the mind – perhaps more formally called abduction – the crucial point is that 
scientific discovery rests, in a sense, on the human imagination or creativity. This is not to 
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suggest that we arbitrarily create the laws of nature but simply that there is a specifically human 
way of knowing that our scientific knowledge rests upon. Even though we have the capacity to 
abstract we cannot transcend our species and become what Firth argues as “ideal observers.”169 
This idea will be discussed at some length before returning to Medawar’s ideas and contributions 
of scientific thought with reference to this paper.  
Peter van Inwagen argues, contrary to the ideas presented in Medawar that scientific 
know-ability rests on a human scale, that there is objective know ability in science distinct from 
any human subjectivity. Arguing specifically against the pragmatists, van Inwagen states that 
simply because a word is vague, this does not change the truth value of the concrete facts. He 
responds citing the height of Mount Everest as an example. Most would not contest that Mount 
Everest is 8,847.7 metres high. Neither can this fact be refuted by appealing to the relationship of 
tall to small things; there is concreteness to this number that has no bearing on any relationship. 
Furthermore it is in no way contingent on any type of human knowledge or human influence. As 
van Inwagen states; “If no human had ever evolved, and if no other intelligent beings inhabited 
the earth, the vast, slow collision of the Indian subcontinent with the continent of Asia, which is 
what caused […] the rise of the Himalayan Mountains [it] would  have occurred in exactly the 
fashion that it did.”170 As there is no human influence and consequently no mind to refer 
relationship, this fact of the height of Mount Everest is an objective truth not subject to the 
relativity of human understanding and limitation. Thus by simply measuring the height of the 
mountain we can learn the objective, impersonal, fact about its height.
171
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Empirical knowledge is not simply subject to our whim nor does this mean that it is 
completely relative but that we have human lenses through which we view the material world, 
which we cannot remove. Van Inwagen is correct in pointing out that since the evolution of 
humankind has had no influence (or as far as we can tell) on the collision of the subcontinents 
that we have no influence on the actual fact of the mountain. However, from this, he concludes 
that we can then know the objective, non-human-influenced, height of the mountain. This 
conclusion is too hasty and simply overlooks the human aspect to further conclude that it is not 
present. Metres are an efficient way to measure the height of the mountain; they are large enough 
that there is the possibility of encompassing the vast height of the mountain but small enough or 
to enough to a human scale that we can understand what a metre looks like and thus further grasp 
that over 8000 metres is quite large. Certainly Mount Everest is 8,847.7 metres high but what if it 
is measured in millimetres? Each millimetre unit is placed on each surface of the mountain 
measuring around each uneven surface or jutting edge of each stone. Measured this way the 
mountain would be much taller than 8000 metres once all of the millimetres were added together. 
Measuring Mount Everest with millimetres seems ridiculous, but it is only ridiculous because it 
so impractical to us. For an ant this may be a completely practical way of measuring the height 
of the mountain because this unit of measure is to the scale of the ant. Thus the relationship of 
the person to the objective size of the mountain is relevant. When measured in a specific way, 
using metres, the mountain is a specific height but what are the reasons that we use this specific 
method of measuring and this unit of height? The reasons for this method of measuring are 
because they are to our human scale. Our way of measuring has no bearing on the actual states of 
affairs of the mountain (although this is allowing that we overlook the fact that the human has to 
determine where the mountain is distinct from the rest of the land thus determining which point it 
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ought to be measured from) in this van Inwagen is correct but in terms of “objectively” knowing 
the height of the mountain we must accept that we know the height only in relation to how it 
pertains to us.
172
 We can objectively know the height of the mountain in metres but it is the 
relation of the metre to our human scale or size that measures the mountain in metres in the first 
place; we subjectively know that it is objectively true that Mount Everest is 8,847.7 metres. 
Similarly, Medawar argues that all of scientific inquiry rests on two pillars, which 
together form the “metatheory” without which reason cannot rest: logical syntax and semantics. 
As he states, “logical syntax, deals with the concepts of formal truth and falsity and the 
ordinances that govern the activity of deducing. . . . semantics, more recent origin and lay circles 
now more fashionable, deal with the theory of the meanings of words and the ideas of material 
truth and falsity.”173 This cooperation of the content and form of truth and falsity in the scientific 
endeavor does not underwrite the existence of facts or logical form outside of our understanding, 
but simply that since we are doing the understanding the content cannot be excluded from the 
form and the content comes with our human-infused preferences or ideas.  
4. Wendell Berry  
Finally, Wendell Berry offers the concept of “affection” that is essential to the 
development of a plausible environmental ethic. In his lecture “It All Turns on Affection,” 
Wendell Berry makes the distinction between “stickers” and “boomers.” “Boomers” are those 
who want to exploit the land, with an eye only to monetary gain and after having done so, to live 
their lives work-free and wealthy, whereas, “Stickers on the contrary are motivated by affection, 
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by such love for a place and its life that they want to preserve it and remain in it.”174 Driven by 
“boomers” the current economy ignores the land economy, in the interests of dollars and cents. 
The love of land and the well-being of the land is preserved only through the love of the 
“sticker.” As he states in reference to his family ties to their historical land, “if we had not lived 
there to be reminded and to remember, nobody would have remembered. If we, like most of our 
generation, had moved away, the place with its memories would have been lost to us and we to 
it. . . . I am fairly literally flesh of its flesh.”175 Berry emphasises the bond between himself and 
the land, acknowledging that he is made by the land – he is dependent upon it and it has become 
a part of him. However, this ability rests on the fact that he loves the land, a love cultivated 
through personal and experiential knowledge of it. A personal love that lives through the 
memory and the interaction between himself and the land, as he states: 
But the risk, I think, is only that affection is personal. If it is not 
personal, it is nothing; we don’t, at least, have to worry about 
governmental or corporate affection. And one of the endeavors of 
human cultures, from the beginning, has been to qualify and direct 
the influence of emotion. The word ‘affection’ and the terms of 
value that cluster around it – love, care, sympathy, mercy, 
forbearance, respect, reverence – have histories and meanings that 
raise the issue of worth. We should, as our culture has warned us 
over and over again, give our affection to things that are true, just, 
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and beautiful. When we give affection to things that are 
destructive, we are wrong.
176
  
The personal love rests on our ability to show and experience love as persons (which 
admittedly sounds like a tautology), which further rests on the capacity to interact with those 
whom we love on a personal level – entailing a love within the human scale. To illustrate the 
importance of the human scale to personal love, Berry uses the example of the industrialization 
of the tobacco industry and its relationship with his grandfather.  
Berry explains that the industrialist James B. Duke, was a man who in his early years 
would have known those similar to Berry’s grandfather. In later years as the tobacco industry 
grew in size, the farmers, such as Berry’s grandfather, become removed and as such reduced to a 
mere statistic, or in Berry’s terms, as “negligible detail;” once seen in this regard, they could be 
dismissed or hurt with little or no concern. The size and distance caused by the industry removed 
any feeling of “community” or care from those persons and as such the land that was their 
heritage, home, and method of provision, could be used for monetary growth without a care to 
the loss of those dwelling therein. As Berry states, “Power deals ‘efficiently’ with quantities that 
affection cannot recognize.”177 However, as Berry argues, this size and the resulting power of 
industrialism, for industrialisms’ sake, rests on the notion that the land and the people can be 
“divorced without harm.”178 And furthermore in this divorce, that the human prospect can be 
brightened through subjugation and exploitation of the land for wealth’s sake. However, this is 
not the case, as Berry states, “But land abuse cannot brighten the human prospect. There is in 
fact no distinction between the fate of the land and the fate of the people. When one is abused, 
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the other suffers.”179 Resting on the notion that we are intrinsically connected to the land by 
trying to separate that connection and exploit the one ultimately ends up as a misuse and/or abuse 
of the other. However, this does not necessitate that all persons become farmers or should not 
have jobs in industries, offices, etc., simply that the exploitation of the land cannot be done 
without an exploitation of humanity as well.  
In our current age we are unwilling to accept the physical limitations of our species and 
endeavor to step outside the bounds of our physicality. As Berry states, “Now the two great aims 
of industrialism – replacement of people by technology and concentration of wealth into the 
hands of a small plutocracy – seem close to fulfillment.”180 These aims are the opposite of the 
foundations of nature and culture which are, according to Berry, “The fertility cycle turns by the 
law of nature. The cultural cycle turns on affection.”181 “In my region and within my memory, 
for example, human life has become less creaturely and more engineered, less familiar and more 
remote from local places, resources, pleasures, and associations. Our knowledge, in short, has 
become increasingly statistical.”182 Statistical knowledge is known by means of “facts” or “data.” 
This type of knowledge assumes an ownership or dominion over the knowledge, which is 
inherently problematic if we “know” our land solely in this manner. As he states, “Statistical 
knowledge is remote, and it isolates us in our remoteness.”183 As illustrated by the tale about his 
grandfather, this type of removed-knowing also allows us to inflict harm easily and without care, 
as it is already at a distance so removed that we cannot properly care. Berry further claims, 
“Propriety of scale in all human undertakings is paramount, and we ignore it. We are now betting 
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our lives on quantities that far exceed all our powers of comprehension. . . . we are thus isolated 
within our uniquely human boundaries, which we certainly cannot transcend or escape by means 
of technological devices.”184 Berry uses the striking example of the effect on our hearts of the 
knowledge of many deaths in war, as opposed to the gravity of one death fully imagined. Citing 
it as a “horrible fact” that we can read in the paper of many deaths and destruction without 
breaking down – a thought that ought to terrify us – this ability to receive this knowledge with 
apparent apathy is because these facts have been removed beyond our scope of knowledge. He 
says, “The effort to connect cities with their surrounding rural landscapes rests exactly upon the 
recognition of human limits and the necessity of human scale.”185 The appropriate human scale 
breeds affection for the things within that sphere and it is this affection that is necessary in order 
to instill and develop a plausible environmental ethic. As Berry states, “Affection can teach us, 
and soon enough, if we grant appropriate standing to affection.”186 However, in order to have, 
cultivate, and receive affection, we must acknowledge our physical limits and reorient ourselves 
within a natural human scale. 
II. Re-adjusting the Moral Structures 
A. Re-adjustment to Radical Ecology 
As discussed in chapter one, one of the greatest contributions of the radical ecology movement is 
that it allows for the acknowledgement of the needs and existence of beings beyond their 
mechanistic parts. This aspect allows for the “sacralising” or re-enchanting of the natural world – 
resulting is a mystical-type language or experience; something which Aldo Leopold (and 
Christopher Alexander) refers to as “a quality without name.” Through the extension of the 
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ethical community to include all of the biotic community, they claim that the mechanising, use-
valuing, of the nonhuman will be expunged. However, this action is primarily done through the 
“stabilizing” of the human population, a solution reached through the logically incoherent 
statement regarding the human species.
187
  Based on this claim Deep Ecologists conclude that the 
number of consumers must be reduced. The increasingly larger human population, as consumers, 
tends to use the nonhuman world for our own selfish needs and wants with little regard for the 
well-being of the nonhuman world. As the solution to the problem of the rampant consumerism 
by humans, their initial solution is to decrease the number of possible “consumers.” The radical 
ecologists are correct in identifying the birth of the problem and misuse of the natural world as 
stemming from the growth of the scientific revolution; the Baconian and Cartesian method of the 
reduction and analysis – in its extreme form and with only this view – does appear to “justify” a 
misuse. However, it is not that this is an anthropocentric “justification.” This method of viewing 
the world solely in these terms also strips dignity from the human species and reduces us to little 
more than “consumers” or” users.” 
It is not that the anthropocentric ethic causes the misuse of the nonhuman world, but that 
the interpretation or view of our species as users perpetuates that identity in our actions. In Small 
is Beautiful Schumacher acknowledges that the greatest problem with our economy is poverty. 
The developing countries, he argues, and indeed it would be generally acknowledged, struggle 
with the mass migration to cities, starvation, etc. While the central problem is poverty, it is not 
simply a lack of goods but a poverty of the whole person – inclusive of spiritual goods, 
education, physical health, etc. Thus the solution is not simply throwing material goods at the 
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poor in the developing countries. The criticism that Schumacher raises regarding “aid” is similar 
to the solution advocated by radical ecology. On a fundamental level, the radical ecology 
movement suggests that we remove the poor in order to “solve” the problem of poverty. They 
couch the removal in the softer language of “stabilizing” as it is a positive word conjuring 
imagery of building and strength and is certainly easier to swallow than a blunt appeal to 
eradicate any possible new consumers. While it is the consumer culture that is the problem the 
solution is not simply to remove possible consumers. This creates a twofold shift – it reaffirms 
our understanding of humans solely as consumers while not actually addressing the problem. 
Recall that this was part of the logical contradiction we were left with at the end of Chapter One.  
The radical ecology emphasis on a global solution to the environmental problems we face 
removes the issue from our hands and by its very scale prevents a plausible solution. As the 
problem is a global one, the radical ecology movement emphasized a solution on a global scale. 
Although perhaps laudable in its intent, this emphasis one a global solution perpetuates the 
distance and removes the issues from the sphere of human affection – a problem addressed by 
Berry above. By removing the solution from the human scale, not only does this remove the 
issue from our level and capacity of affection, it is also dismissal of our manner of knowing and 
our physicality. In doing so, it also removes contributions from certain members of society and 
thus becomes elitist.
188
 By turning our attention from the human characteristics in favour of a 
global way of thinking our form of action becomes ineffective. However, if we return to a 
legitimate way of human action with an embrace of the uniqueness of our species to reflect, to 
love, to know, then in doing so we return to the scale that will allow for plausible and positive 
changes. Furthermore, this type of action does not require that we not try and implement this 
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type of action and thinking on a global level, it is only the order which is reversed. We begin 
with a focus on the individual persons and societies and encourage this concern for individuals 
on a more global level.  
Applying the concepts from each of the thinkers above to our understanding of the human 
species, this can resolve the contradiction that the radical ecology espouses. We must first see the 
members of our own species as the creative, meaning imbuing, beings of affection that we are: 
that we cannot be reduced to our mechanistic parts and known only through our material 
consumption. Recall the logical contradiction we were left with at the end of Chapter One: the 
human species is not unique and must be given no special consideration over the rest of the 
biotic community and the human species is unique and can cause destruction on a level far 
surpassing any other member of the biotic community so this species alone must be actively 
stabilized with an eye to reduction. Reason does not allow for us to genuinely accept both of 
these propositions. Additionally, since the conversation about how we are causing environmental 
problems is a conversation that we are having the second proposition appears self-evidently true. 
However, the first part of the second proposition is only self-evident; it is not self-evident that 
the human species must be reduced, nor do I think it necessary. Once we accept that perhaps our 
species is unique, then only can we begin to ask “how?” in the hopes that we can use this 
uniqueness to aid our environmental pursuits. As the thinkers above, but particularly Leopold 
and Berry, argue we are unique in our ability to feel affection for all members of the biotic 
community. This ability rests on our human capacity to act within our human scale. Recall the 
example from Leopold and the shooting of the wolf.  
In short in order to recognize the other members of the biotic community as community 
members, we must first see those members of our own species as members of our community not 
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as individuals that can be sacrificed for the good of the whole.
189
 However this capability as 
argued by Berry, rests on our ability to act or think affectionately towards others. This further 
requires that we do not exceed our limitations in knowing and interactions for in doing so we do 
reduce humanity to consumers or degrade some aspect of our species. This degradation is 
excellently illustrated in Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner.  
The problem lies with our inability to find community with anyone, not just those outside 
our human community, as a result of the denial of some aspect of our species we do not find 
community with anyone, human or otherwise. It rests on an autonomous use-valuing of our 
human species, instead of a communitarian ethics. Instead of being anthropocentric the practice 
of this type of ethics might more accurately be described as solipsistic or self-centred. 
Coleridge’s anthropology offers insight into the problem and the central defining feature of 
humanity as our ability to love. As Christopher Dinkel states in reference to the Coleridge’s 
anthropology: 
“The mariner’s curse is brought about by his killing the albatross, 
and his salvation is initiated by his learning to love the sea-snakes 
that had so revolted him. . . . In the poem, the mariner forfeits his 
humanness in his senseless killing of the albatross. In effect, the 
mariner has become imbruted. The act of killing the albatross 
indicates the Mariner’s fragmented humanness. This loveless act 
moves the Mariner into a world devoid of love and even the 
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capacity to love. Whatever he had been before, he has further 
degraded whatever humanity he had.”190 
This interpretation of Coleridge’s portrayal of the fall of the Mariner is analogous to the problem 
of the post-Enlightenment ethics showing the inability to recognize those with whom we are (or 
ought to be) in community with and encounter them with a genuine expression of care.  
The radical ecology movement suggests that we see other species and members of the 
biotic community as community. In doing so, however, they request that we see those closest to 
our community with less value; citing anthropocentrism as the root of the ecological crisis 
humans are “justifiably” condemned. However it is not that case that anthropocentrism is the 
cause of the problem. Indeed if the ethics “justifying” ecological abuse were actually 
anthropocentric, the poor, indeed all persons, would be of central concern as well. If this were the 
case, then the economy could not run on the exploitation of the poor or developing countries. If 
that were the case, then there would not be such an exploitation of the nonhuman world because, 
as Rolston argues we do need urban, rural, and wilderness landscapes for human well-being. It is 
the “justification” of exploitation that is the problem. The exploitation is not limited to nature or 
women or the nonhuman, but it includes an exploitation of all of the poor and of human nature in 
general. Our capacity for consumption and greed are great – these characteristics are exploited 
even by ourselves and the other elements of our beings over looked – thus “justifying” our 
actions as consumers and exploiters.  
 The deep ecology movement offers invaluable insight into the encounter with others in 
the nonhuman community, emphasizing that beings are not reducible to their use value to 
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humans but to be respected in their own right. While their criticism of human actions is astute, 
the radical ecology movement over-corrects and ends up reducing the value of the human species 
and rejecting the necessity of recognizing the closeness of our human community. It disregards 
the unique ability of our species to feel affection and moral responsibility to others. However, 
this ability is something that cannot be extended to the members of the biotic community unless 
we learn it first from members of our own species as it is a skill or habit developed and 
cultivated in relationship with persons, places, and other species.   
B. Re-adjustment to Holistic Environmental Ethics 
 A similar shift in focus with regards to humanity is necessary for the holistic 
environmental ethics to be plausible as well. J. Baird Callicott insightfully describes the 
immorality of our human actions as the result of the scale of the widespread misuse, abuse, and 
subjugation of the other members of the biotic community. However, he then in turn, offers the 
Humean ethical creed as the solution. His criticism is astute and completely accurate however 
the solution perhaps does not get far enough to the heart of the issue. Callicott’s argument that 
the problem with human interference on the rest of the nonhuman world is the large scale with 
which it is done, that it is done on a scale that surpasses our natural human needs, however as the 
solution he dismisses the human scale in his correction and goes to the concepts of adaptability 
and natural selection for the source of the solution. In essence, he identifies the scale as the 
problem but then does not consider the possibility of a realistic scale as the solution. While the 
evidence for evolution is incredibly compelling, it is not necessary that we take mindless 
adaptability with the fact/value distinction as the foundation for ethics. Incorporating the thought 
of Medawar, since, abduction is prior to inductive falsifiability in the scientific method – an 
ability which implies and entails a specifically human way of knowing and ability to see unity 
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and portray creativity – then would it not also be likely that any ethical creed could rest upon this 
foundation as well? This requires the acceptance that environmental ethics rests on a specifically 
and uniquely human capability. But the crux of the problem, especially with Callicott, is that he 
presents the division of facts and values and tries to argue from the “is” to the “ought.” However, 
the initial step in the way that we discover scientific knowledge begins with our ability to 
already think and to know in a manner that is ontologically prior to induction in the scientific 
method. In acknowledging this point, it is not simply to restate Kant’s critique of Hume or to 
adopt a Kantian model. 
 Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals rests on concepts and distinctions made 
in his Critique of Pure Reason; central to these are his noumenon/phenomenon distinction and 
his synthetic/analytic distinction. With the noumenon/phenomenon distinction in particular, Kant 
argues that we cannot know the material world and that we, the rational animal, are distinct 
because of our ability to reason. Furthermore, because the noumenon (thinking beings) and the 
phenomenon (the rest of the empirical world) are substantially different, we can never know (in a 
scientific way) other noumenon, but can only “think” them.191 Because of this distinction, Kant 
facilitates a further separation of the mind and body, creating a greater divide between humans 
and other species. Because of the division of Kantian epistemology, I do not wish to suggest that 
by beginning with the human capacity of abduction and are specifically human way of knowing 
that we should follow a Kantian model.
192
 Instead of focusing on the a priori, we can simply 
acknowledge the unique ability that we have as a species to think creatively and give and abstract 
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meaning. Applying the concepts of the our species as outlines by Rackham and Medawar above, 
this does not require a separation of our species from the rest of the biotic community in a 
Cartesian or Kantian manner, but it does allow for a different beginning place for a plausible 
environmental ethic. Instead of beginning with pure reason, or with the Darwinian model alone, 
claiming our homogeneity with other species, we begin with our embodied but unique abilities. 
By beginning with our embodied unique abilities we are still in accordance with the evolutionary 
theory. In doing so, we do not have to underwrite or apologise for our capacities, nor does it 
require that we consider ourselves to be completely set apart from the rest of the nonhuman 
world. However, it does allow for a genuine place of beginning, as Berthold-Bond would argue: 
an acknowledgement of our subjectivity as the foundation for place-making capacities. 
Although the adjustment to holistic environmental ethics rests on the recognition of the 
importance of humanity, this does not mean that we do not have a responsibility to act ethically 
towards the rest of the biotic community. However, it should be acknowledged that our ability to 
recognize that we are in community to the other members of the biosphere is through our unique 
ability to think creatively – a capability which also does set us apart from the rest of the biotic 
community (or at least as far as we know at this point). Ontologically speaking the ability to see 
unity and think abductively is prior to the know ability of scientific theories. Because of this 
ontological priority, the uniqueness of humanity should  be applied to an ethical creed, if it is 
using evolutionary theory as the foundation for ethics. If one is appealing to the scientific method 
as the justification for ethics then one ought to recognize the first step in the method.  
 Conclusion 
It is popular and easy to blame anthropocentrism as the reason for the environmental crises that 
we face today. And while it is clear that addressing a specific human greed and particular set of 
101 
 
the human species – it is not clear that it is anthropocentrism properly speaking that is the 
problem. Assuming that morality is a benefit to the human life and we are considering needs 
beyond just the material and we are including the poor as members of the humanity then a true 
anthropocentrism would entail ethical actions towards the rest of the biotic community. Our 
current consumer driven, industrial production of unnecessary goods, can only be maintained on 
the backs of exploited labour, which appears to be anti-human or egocentric as opposed to 
anthropocentric. Thus contrary to the predominant claims that our ethics are anthropocentric, 
they appear to be inherently anti-human.  
Genuine anthropocentrism is not the creed that justifies the exploitation of the nonhuman 
world, but anti-humanism under the guise of meeting human needs is the root of the problem. 
Even in claiming that the problem is anthropocentrism perpetuates the myth that humanity is not 
more than the sum of its parts – that very issue that environmental philosophy is trying to resolve 
with respect to the rest of the nonhuman world. Thus to claim that a natural species, resulting as 
the evidence would suggest from evolutionary processes, already assumes the reduction of 
humanity to its chemical or mechanistic parts – an application of Cartesian and Baconian 
thinking in the effort to solving the problems that result from Cartesian-Baconian distillations.  
As a beginning point for a logically coherent and plausible environmental ethic, we must 
develop a human-scaled method of acting and knowing. This beginning place further requires 
that we act ethically towards members of our own species, in a manner that the Radical 
Ecologists and Holistic Environmental Ethicists do not call for us to do. They claim that we must 
learn to cultivate and ethics of care for the biotic community and at the same time dismiss those 
who are closest in our community. These claims contain logical inconsistencies and do not offer 
a plausible solution. While the scope of this paper will not allow for the step-by-step break down 
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of what creating a culture of care with a true anthropocentric concern would look like, a genuine 
anthropocentrism must not be dismissed because of the abuses of a “so-called” anthropocentric 
creed.  
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Conclusion 
While anthropocentric ethical frameworks provide an easy scapegoat for the current 
ecological problems we face, in reality the problem is not quite so simple. The Radical Ecology 
movement and the Holistic Environmental Ethics movements each blame anthropocentrism as 
the source of the widespread abuse of the nonhuman world, whereas it is a certain interpretation 
of humans as simply consumers or users that is the problem. This view is an oversimplification 
and even abuse of who we are as humans. Both of these movements provide accurate and 
insightful critiques of philosophical frameworks and historical events that have led to the 
problems that we currently face. However, each requires that a shift regarding our understanding 
of humanity be made in order to lend logical coherence and plausibility of application. 
The Radical Ecology approach primarily requires that we acknowledge that the human 
species should be given special consideration in order to maintain that we are uniquely capable 
of causing harm. Once this is acknowledged we can then ask why or in what ways we are unique. 
With these questions we can begin to consider practical and human approaches to solving 
ecological problems, recalling the abilities and embodied methods of our species. Likewise, the 
Holistic Environmental Ethics approach also is too hasty in dismissing elements of the human 
species. This method is more consistent with the evolutionary theory and scientific method 
which adds to the plausibility and verifiability of this ethical creed. However, the foundation of 
ethics should not be empirical verifiability but instead should rest on a philosophical claim; 
doing so requires that we acknowledge the human-infused elements of knowledge that 
accompany our philosophical inquiries. The emphasis of the goodness of human action and the 
immorality of the vast scale of the destruction are invaluable contributions to establishing a 
coherent and plausible environmental ethic.  
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It is important to acknowledge the uniqueness of the human species in order to develop a 
plausible and logically coherent environmental ethic. The first step in a practical application or 
development of this ethic is to adopt a genuine human scale, embracing our physicality and the 
method of knowing and the human affection that comes from this human scale, which includes 
adopting many of the earlier philosophical insights that have been dismissed by many modern 
environmental philosophical systems, often without any argument or rationale. This paper 
provides arguments that show the necessity of the human scale be included as a premise in 
establishing a practical and logical environmental solution. What ethical creed this human-scaled 
value system should follow remains to be established. How to implicate this approach on a 
practical level working within the existing elements of our society and culture also needs to be 
established. The step-by-step philosophical foundation and the practical applications require 
further thought. To reiterate, first we must recognise our place within the biotic community, then 
embrace our physical humanity, to work towards a moral, logical, and affectionate manner of 
engaging with the nonhuman world. 
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